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The Rise and Fall of the Implied
Warranty of Habitability
David A. Super*
Growing concern about poverty in the late 1960s produced two
sweeping legal revolutions. One gave welfare recipients specific
legal rights against arbitrary eligibility rules and benefit
terminations. The other gave low-income tenants recourse when
landlords failed to repair their homes. The 1996 welfare law exposed
the welfare rights revolution’s frailty by ending Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) and severely cutting other key
programs. Little noticed by legal scholars, the tenants’ rights
revolution’s centerpiece, the implied warranty of habitability, also
has failed, and for broadly similar reasons.
Deliberately withholding rent to challenge a landlord’s failure
to repair is not viable for many tenants in ill-maintained dwellings:
either moving to better housing is a smarter option or the risk of
retaliation from the tenant’s landlord is too great. The implied
warranty could still motivate landlords to repair if it limited evictions
of low-income tenants who fall behind on their rent for other reasons,
but a set of obscure yet powerful doctrines deem these tenants
unworthy to claim the warranty’s protection. Moreover, reformers
left implementation to courts with neither the resources nor the
inclination to transform landlord-tenant relations.
None of this was inevitable. The doctrines that effectively limited
the warranty to deliberate withholding of rent had weak
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justifications. And contemporaneous procedural innovation in other
areas of law offered alternatives to the unresponsive courts.
More daunting than legal doctrine was the transformation of the
housing market. In today’s market, fewer low-income tenants live in
decrepit dwellings, but many suffer housing problems whose
consequences may be even more severe: overcrowded units, locations
far removed from jobs and good schools, and unmanageable rents.
Lacking a clear, unified purpose, the tenants’ rights revolution’s
legacy has failed to address these changes.
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INTRODUCTION
The antipoverty movement in the 1960s spawned two seemingly very
different legal revolutions. In public law, the courts gave low-income people
new substantive and procedural rights to welfare and other public benefits, and
Congress established new or expanded programs providing health insurance,
food assistance, and aid to the elderly and persons with disabilities. In private
law, courts and state legislatures recognized sweeping new rights for lowincome tenants. The focus of this effort was to find an implied warranty of
habitability in residential leases, which was mutual with the tenant’s covenant
to pay rent. The foundational cases of these two revolutions, Goldberg v. Kelly1
and Javins v. First National Realty Corp.,2 are the only poverty law cases many
law students read.3
Over the past two decades, many of the pillars of the welfare rights
revolution have collapsed. Congress repealed the sixty-year-old Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) welfare program,4 sought to strip welfare
recipients of legal entitlements,5 slashed program funding,6 and shifted
policymaking authority to states,7 whose will8 and capacity9 to assist low-

1. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
2. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
3. In addition, some contracts casebooks include Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). That case initially seemed to be the opening shot in a
revolution on behalf of low-income consumers. Difficulty formulating satisfactory doctrinal bases
of such a program, however, left only a smattering of isolated cases. The difficulties that aborted
the nascent low-income consumers’ revolution parallel closely those of the tenants’ rights
revolution addressed below.
4. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193, § 103(a)(1), 110 Stat. 2105, 2112 repealing 42 U.S.C. §§ 601–617 (1994)).
5. Id. § 116(c) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 601 note (2006)) (disclaiming any entitlement to
cash assistance after October 1, 1996); id. § 601(b) (same); see David A. Super, Are Rights
Efficient? Challenging the Managerial Critique of Individual Rights, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1051,
1085–97 (2005) (describing the accomplishments and limits of legal entitlements in public
benefits law) [hereinafter Super, Efficient Rights].
6. DAVID A. SUPER ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, THE NEW WELFARE
LAW (1996) (finding that the 1996 welfare law cut almost $55 billion over six years from
programs for low-income people).
7. See Jon Michaels, Deforming Welfare, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 573, 600–04 (2004)
(identifying structural and substantive difficulties in transferring welfare programs to states).
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income people is open to question. More broadly, the switch from large
government budget surpluses early in the last decade to deficits as far as the eye
can see,10 and the impending retirement of the baby boomers, have created
fiscal pressures likely to lead to strong pressures for further cutbacks in these
programs.11 The prospects for substantial improvements to the government’s
tax-and-transfer policies for low-income people therefore are cloudy at best.
Under these circumstances, regulatory policy naturally will receive
renewed attention as an alternative means of relieving low-income people’s
difficulties. Developing countries lacking the resources and infrastructure to
relieve poverty through tax-and-transfer policies commonly maintain a range of
industrial subsidies, price controls, trade restraints, and other market
interventions, with the goal of easing the burdens of their poorest citizens.12
Anti-regulatory economists have largely persuaded policymakers in this
country that direct governmental transfers are a far superior means of poverty
reduction,13 but both legislatures and courts are likely to reopen that question if
direct transfers cease to be available due to budgetary constraints. If regulation
is reconsidered, the tenants’ rights revolution—the boldest regulatory assault on
poverty since the New Deal—will likely be a major focus of attention.
The late 1960s and early 1970s saw wide-ranging changes in tenants’
rights. The civil rights movement led to prohibitions on racial discrimination.14
Federal housing programs began subsidizing rents in privately owned
buildings; landlords accepting those subsidies were required to afford tenants a
host of new rights.15 Some jurisdictions imposed rent control,16 prohibited
evictions without just cause,17 limited condominium conversions,18 or
8. See Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor:
Accounting for the Tyranny of State Majorities, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 552, 585 (1999) (finding state
political processes dominated by affluent suburban interests hostile to low-income people).
9. See David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2614–40
(2005) (finding states’ fiscal constitutions implicitly biased against programs for low-income
people and particularly ill-suited to maintaining countercyclical programs).
10. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK (January 2010).
11. See HENRY J. AARON & ROBERT D. REISCHAUER, COUNTDOWN TO REFORM: THE
GREAT SOCIAL SECURITY DEBATE 51–53 (rev. & updated ed. 2001).
12. Economists commonly blame policies restricting free trade for poverty in developing
countries. See, e.g., JEFFREY D. SACHS, THE END OF POVERTY 52–55 (2005); MILTON FRIEDMAN,
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 72–73 (1962). Whether or not this oversimplifies, the reverse
certainly is often true: severe poverty, and the failure to address it directly through transfers,
creates political imperatives to intervene in the market for low-income people.
13. FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 177–82.
14. See, e.g., Fair Housing Act of 1968, Public Act No. 112 of 1968 (codified at MICH.
COMP. LAWS §§ 564.101–564.704 (1970)), superseded by Public Act No. 453 of 1976.
15. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.694a (West 2006) (prohibiting evictions
from subsidized housing without just cause).
16. See, e.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1947.8 (West 2011) (allowing localities to control rents).
17. See, e.g., 2A N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18-61.2 (West 2000) (setting forth permissible causes
for terminating tenancies).
18. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 559.204 (West 2006) (giving tenants rights in

Super.docx (Do Not Delete)

2011]

THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY

4/26/2011 10:58 PM

393

authorized receiverships for ill-maintained rental housing.19 The most
prominent result of the revolution, however, was reading an implied warranty
of habitability into residential leases,20 with a corollary prohibition on evictions
in retaliation for asserting these new rights.21 These measures, eventually
adopted in almost every state, seemed to reverse the landlord’s historical
dominance of the landlord-tenant relationship.
Reexamining the tenants’ rights revolution is particularly timely because
of recent changes in the housing market. The burst of the housing bubble in
2007 has resulted in a glut of vacant homes.22 In addition, high energy costs
and urban revitalization programs are leading many more affluent people to
abandon suburbs and return to central cities. Although not widely recognized at
the time, a similar housing glut helped launch the tenants’ rights revolution23 by
forcing a historically anomalous moderation in rents that caused many to
believe tighter regulation was possible. The housing vacancies of the 1960s and
1970s resulted from the white middle class’s abandonment of the central cities
in response to racial fears, the Federal Housing Administration’s (FHA) deep
subsidies of building costs, and the new Interstate Highway System’s subsidy
of commuting costs from the suburbs.24 Many of the new suburbanites were
first-time homebuyers vacating urban rentals. And for those who owned homes
in cities, the subsidies were often sufficient to justify absorbing large losses on
their former homes to relocate to the suburbs. This created a huge glut of
housing, much of it initially quite good, that the urban rental market had to
assimilate.25 For a variety of reasons, however, much of that housing was
lost—abandoned, destroyed, or gentrified—and with it the prospects for a
relatively inexpensive improvement in millions of low-income tenants’ quality
of life. Subsidized housing has never been sufficient to accommodate more
than a small fraction of this country’s low-income people; in its absence, older
housing left by families moving to more desirable neighborhoods has been the
major source of housing for low-income people.26 The failure to make the

condominium conversions).
19. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.535 (West 2006) (setting terms for such
receiverships).
20. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 554.139 (West 2006) (implying three qualityrelated covenants into residential leases).
21. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5720(1)(b), (c) (West 2000) (creating defenses
against retaliation for complaints to code enforcement agencies or other lawful acts as a tenant).
22. Jim Harger, Housing Groups Seek Inspection Equity; Single-Family Rentals, Inflated
by Foreclosures, Get Free Pass, THE GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Dec. 21, 2010, at A1.
23. Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Landlord-Tenant Law, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517,
562–66 (1984).
24. KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE
UNITED STATES 7–27 (1985).
25. Id. at 203–18.
26. MICHAEL N. DANIELSON, THE POLITICS OF EXCLUSION 5–6 (1976).
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housing being vacated today due to mortgage foreclosures and reurbanization
available to low-income people would repeat that tragedy.
To avoid repeating the failures of past reforms requires understanding
why they fell short. The similarities between the welfare rights revolution and
the tenants’ rights revolution are instructive. The welfare rights revolution gave
recipients of subsistence benefit programs the right to advance hearings to
challenge reductions or terminations in those benefits27 and prohibited
eligibility conditions not authorized by federal law,28 in particular rules
counting money not available to families as income.29
The essence of the tenants’ rights revolution was similarly straightforward. Legislatures and courts read implied warranties of habitability and
repair into residential leases30 and made them mutual with the tenant’s
covenant to pay rent.31 Tenants could raise the landlord’s failure to comply
with these obligations as a defense in an eviction proceeding for nonpayment of
rent.32 This was seen as updating landlord-tenant law from the archaic vision of
estates in land to the modern world of contracts and as giving landlords
incentives to repair blighted housing. An early flurry of scholarship debated the
economics of housing code enforcement and, by extension, its private-law
analogue, the implied warranty of habitability.33 In the following years,
however, almost every state’s legislature or courts adopted the new regime.34
Courts and legal scholars hailed these changes as breakthroughs in the battle
against slum landlords and as powerful new remedies with which the urban
poor could compel landlords to maintain their buildings adequately.35 Yet the
results achieved by these changes in the law have been far from what their
advocates predicted.
The welfare rights revolution foundered for six basic reasons. First, it
lacked a coherent, broadly accepted set of goals. Some saw the changes as
modernizing administrative law to reflect contemporary means of security
analogous to traditional property rights.36 Some saw the changes as a means of

27.
28.
29.
30.

Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 272–74 (1970).
Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 287 (1971).
Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552, 559–60 (1970).
See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 554.139 (West 2005); UNIF. RESIDENTIAL
LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 4.105, 7B U.L.A. 387 (2009) [hereinafter URLTA]; Javins v.
First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P.2d 470 (Haw.
1969).
31. See, e.g., Berzito v. Gambino, 308 A.2d 17 (N.J. 1973); Fritz v. Warthen, 213 N.W.2d
339 (Minn. 1973).
32. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5720(1)(f) (West 2000).
33. See infra notes 103–117.
34. ROBERT S. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT §§ 3:16, 3:30,
3:31 (1980); id. §§ 3:16, 3.30, 3.31 (Cum. Supp. 2009).
35. See, e.g., Carl Schier, Draftsman: Formulation of Policy, 2 PROSPECTUS 227 (1968);
Mary Ann Beattie, Persuader: Mobilization of Support, 2 PROSPECTUS 239 (1968).
36. Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771–74 (1964).

Super.docx (Do Not Delete)

2011]

THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY

4/26/2011 10:58 PM

395

achieving various instrumental ends37 such as expanding the workforce,38
promoting children’s education,39 or preserving social peace.40 Some saw the
changes as a means of redistributing wealth,41 reversing a deeply entrenched
American resistance to redistribution.42 Finally, some saw the new legal regime
in narrower, humanitarian terms as a means of relieving the most severe
hardships.43 Although subscribers to these widely divergent viewpoints could
all support new procedural rights for welfare claimants, their coalition quickly
fractured when new challenges arose, such as growing public hostility to
welfare programs and recipients’ inability to navigate the hearing process.
Second, at the same time the new order was empowering low-income
people, it could not resist moralizing about them. During the New Deal, the
U.S. Supreme Court boldly declared that “[p]overty and immorality are not
synonymous.”44 By the 1960s, however, the Court was conceding low-income
people’s immorality and making only technical arguments against rules to
punish them: “Congress has determined that immorality and illegitimacy
should be dealt with through rehabilitative measures rather than measures that
punish dependent children . . . .”45 It temporarily abandoned its doctrine of
rejecting attempts to add eligibility conditions not in public benefits statutes to
permit local governments to deny aid to families refusing intrusive investigations of their morality.46 And beginning just weeks after Goldberg v. Kelly, it
upheld rules reducing or denying benefits based on dubious individual47 or
collective48 moral judgments. For many low-income people, the material
sustenance these moralizing rules withheld was far more important than the
procedural rights they granted.49 If anything, the veneer of procedural regularity

37. David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the
Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 597 (2008) [hereinafter Super, Laboratories].
38. DAVID T. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT 19–25 (1988).
39. HERBERT J. GANS, THE WAR AGAINST THE POOR 115 (1995).
40. WALTER I. TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE 319–21 (5th ed. 1994).
41. Super, Laboratories, supra note 37, at 596.
42. For example, in the Federalist Papers, James Madison argued that the structure of
government must ensure the defeat of factions seeking redistribution. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10
(James Madison).
43. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 277 (1970); Super, Laboratories, supra note
37 at 594–95.
44. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941).
45. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 325 (1968).
46. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (allowing officials to make submission to
intrusive home visits a condition of eligibility for AFDC).
47. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (declining to determine whether the state
had adequately accounted for the needs of children in large families).
48. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (allowing states to provide lower grants to
families with children, a group composed disproportionately of African Americans and Latinos,
than to the elderly and persons with disabilities, both groups composed predominately of whites).
49. See Super, Efficient Rights, supra note 5, at 1086–88 (finding only a tiny fraction of
recipients sought fair hearings and only a small fraction of those prevailed).
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added to the sting of the moralizing rules, inhibiting deeper change by giving
the impression that only the confirmed immoral still faced hardship.50
Third, the new welfare regime lacked a coherent, plausible theory of the
nature and causes of poverty. It seemed to regard failures to address poverty as
resulting from aberrations, such as the isolated irrationality of a hasty eligibility
decision or a rogue eligibility rule. In particular, it assumed that low-income
people, although financially impoverished, were relatively affluent in human
capital. Thus, people dependent on subsistence benefits, providing far less than
even many part-time minimum wage jobs, nonetheless were assumed to have
the procedural sophistication to initiate and prosecute claims under a system of
legal rules that even the Supreme Court characterized as “an aggravated assault
on the English language, resistant to attempts to understand it.”51 When it
turned out that few recipients could bring successful claims on their own, and
that Congress was unwilling to fund legal services lawyers to handle more than
a tiny fraction of the cases,52 the new procedural rights became an occasional
annoyance53 rather than a meaningful force in program operations.54
Fourth, and related, the welfare rights revolution had a crude vision of
economics and, in particular, of the conditions and incentives of low-income
people. It ignored transaction costs’ impact on people with very limited means,
which can approximate that of outright denials of benefits.55 More broadly, it
ignored the sense of vulnerability that dominates low-income people’s lives,
creating pervasive fear and stifling assertions of whatever rights they may
have.56 This simplistic economic model also ignored complexities of the
incentives and opportunities of those whom it sought to influence—welfare
eligibility workers.
Fifth, the welfare rights revolution also had a crude vision of institutional
behavior. It incorrectly assumed both that administrative hearing procedures
and broad class action lawsuits would motivate individual eligibility workers to
follow rules57 and that no contrary pressures would arise.58
Finally, the welfare rights revolution failed to anticipate important
changes. It assumed that the conditions afflicting low-income people were
static and would succumb to static reforms. The revolution was thus unprepared

50. David A. Super, The New Moralizers: Transforming the Conservative Legal Agenda,
104 COLUM. L. REV. 2032, 2066–72 (2004) [hereinafter Super, New Moralizers].
51. Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43 n.14 (1985).
52. Super, Efficient Rights, supra note 5, at 1093–95.
53. Id. at 1087–88.
54. Id. at 1097–1117.
55. David A. Super, Offering an Invisible Hand: The Rise of the Personal Choice Model
for Rationing Public Benefits, 113 YALE L.J. 815, 832–35 (2004) [hereinafter Super, Invisible
Hand].
56. Super, Efficient Rights, supra note 5, at 1088.
57. Id. at 1086–89.
58. Id. at 1097–1117.
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for the economic changes after the recessions of 1979–82 eliminated many of
the high-paying, low-skilled industrial jobs that had been the ladder out of
poverty for tens of millions of people.59 Thus, the poverty rate generally
declined through the 1970s as Congress strengthened antipoverty programs60
but then rose dramatically as President Reagan pushed deep cuts in those
programs through Congress61 and recipients could find only low-paying, often
contingent, service-sector jobs.62 The welfare rights revolution also failed to
anticipate changing models of program administration, particularly
privatization.63 The lack of consensus about the reforms’ goals, as well as the
difficulty of the economic challenges, prevented formulation of a coherent
proposal to adapt to dramatic changes in housing markets, labor markets, and
antipoverty policy in subsequent decades.
This Article argues that the tenants’ rights revolution suffered from the
same six fundamental defects that prevented the welfare rights revolution from
having a meaningful impact on poverty, and that it has failed similarly. Part I
surveys the genesis of the implied warranty of habitability and related
innovations. It finds the same normative ambivalence—cleaving on very
similar lines—that prevented the welfare rights revolution from adapting. Some
saw the reforms in solely legalistic terms: replacing property law’s
exceptionalism with contract law’s efficient universality. Others had instrumental aims, seeing tenant protections as a means of improving the urban
physical environment. Still others saw the reforms as a covert means of
achieving broader redistributive ends. Finally, some held a humanitarian vision
of empowering tenants to remedy deplorable housing conditions.64 In addition,
in the years immediately after the urban riots of the mid-1960s, some thought
the reforms would contribute to social peace.
Part I then distills the conditions that must be met for landlord-tenant
reforms to achieve each of these purposes. It finds that, just as new procedural
due process rights were only relevant if claimants challenged denials of
benefits, tenants’ ability and willingness to assert the implied warranty of
habitability were crucial to the tenants’ rights revolution. Two groups of
tenants—those who are financially stable and those who are not—face
significantly different incentive structures. Financially stable tenants are much
less likely to withhold rent voluntarily to force a confrontation with their
landlords than deeply impoverished tenants are to challenge their landlords’
failure to repair when they become involuntary defendants in eviction actions
59. MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE PRICE OF CITIZENSHIP: REDEFINING THE AMERICAN
WELFARE STATE 30–39 (2001).
60. Super, Laboratories, supra note 37, at 584–86.
61. Id. at 587–88.
62. KATZ, supra note 59, at 348–53.
63. David A. Super, Privatization, Policy Paralysis, and the Poor, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 393,
433–44 (2008).
64. See infra Part I.A.
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after falling behind on rent for other reasons. Also vital are the courts’
allocation of sufficient adjudicatory resources to these cases and their ability to
transform their relationships with landlords and tenants. Finally, much of the
benefit of the new regime depends on favorable housing market conditions.
Although several theories of such conditions emerged, the most important raise
significant paradoxes.
Part II identifies the key obstructions to the effectiveness of the reforms.
One set of barriers are little-noticed substantive restrictions on the implied
warranty of habitability that have the effect of preventing most involuntary
defendants—those most likely to raise the warranty—from doing so effectively.
The other barriers are procedural, arising from the lower courts’ failure to adapt
to the very different goals and demands of the new regime they were asked to
enforce. Many of these procedural barriers have close analogues in the public
benefits realm.
Part III finds the new regime’s failure inevitable, both because of its own
internal shortcomings and because of broader changes in the low-income
housing market. It finds these legal shortcomings particularly unfortunate. It
sees dubious policy and doctrinal support for the substantive rules that have
closed the courts to tenants living in decrepit housing whose failure to pay rent
resulted from poverty rather than militancy. It also suggests that lessons from
the “new property” realm of public benefits can guide adjudication in the “old
property” world of landlord-tenant law. In the end, however, it finds
fundamental changes in the low-cost housing market transformed the meaning
of bad housing conditions, leaving the new legal regime ill-suited to confront
low-income tenants’ most serious problems. In the same way, the legacy of the
welfare rights revolution has proven ineffective in responding to the increasing
inadequacy of benefit levels and the collapse of political support for key
programs. This finding suggests far stronger commonalities between fiscal and
regulatory antipoverty law than commonly understood.
The Article concludes with some observations about how to combat the
range of housing problems facing low-income people and offers broad
suggestions about how regulatory interventions on behalf of low-income people
can be more effective. In so doing, it offers a way to integrate lessons from the
welfare and tenants’ rights revolutions.
I.
THE PROMISE OF THE TENANTS’ RIGHTS REVOLUTION
Because the tenants’ rights revolution enjoyed broad and diverse adoption,
it should not be surprising that the implied warranty of habitability had more
than one driving purpose. On the national level, the tenants’ rights revolution of
the late 1960s and 1970s was unusual among law reform initiatives in that it
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proceeded simultaneously through case law and legislation.65 In some states,
the courts went first in announcing a warranty of habitability. In others, the
legislature acted, sometimes by adopting the Uniform Residential Landlord and
Tenant Act (URLTA)66 and sometimes by amending existing summary eviction
statutes.67 Although the implied warranty received considerable attention in
states that had been wracked by urban unrest in the 1960s, it came into force in
many rural states at about the same time.
Section A identifies four leading purposes of the tenants’ rights
revolution. All but one of these purposes was instrumental, seeing the new legal
regime as a means of accomplishing one or another change in society rather
than as an end in itself. Disagreement about the relative importance, or even
basic legitimacy, of these purposes proved important in limiting their
effectiveness, as Part II demonstrates. Section B then explores the conditions
necessary for the achievement of the new regime’s instrumental goals.
A. The Goals of the Tenants’ Rights Revolution
The tenants’ rights and welfare rights revolutions proceeded from
strikingly similar premises. Four major purposes motivated the welfare rights
revolution of the 1960s and 1970s. First, some saw the extension of legal rights
to public benefits cases as a modernizing move, affording the vital interests of
those programs’ beneficiaries the same kinds of protections that real property
had secured to individual interests in an agrarian age.68 Second, some
advocated expanding low-income people’s rights in public benefit programs as
a means of accomplishing other social ends, such as reducing crime and
securing social peace.69 Third, welfare rights appealed to some as a means of
redistributing income.70 Finally, giving public benefit programs’ recipients
legal rights seemed to some an effective means of achieving the humanitarian
ends of those programs.71

65. See Neil K. Komesar, The Revolution in Landlord-Tenant Law: A Comparative
Institutional View, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 612 (1984) (urging comparison of the efficiency of these
two paths).
66. 7B U.L.A. 387 (Supp. 1999); see Charles J. Meyers, The Covenant of Habitability and
the American Law Institute, 27 STAN. L. REV. 879 (1975) (discussing how ALI helped lead this
transformation).
67. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 600.5720, 600.5741 (1972).
68. See Reich, supra note 36, at 785–86 (arguing that property rights are crucial to
defending the individual against state intrusion and that public benefits form the modern analogue
to traditional property rights).
69. See U.S. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 457–67 (1968) [hereinafter KERNER COMMISSION
REPORT].
70. See FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS
264–65 (1977).
71. See Super, Laboratories, supra note 37, at 594–95; Super, Efficient Rights, supra note
5, at 1058–60.

Super.docx (Do Not Delete)

400

4/26/2011 10:58 PM

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99:389

Each of these purposes had at least a rough analogue in the four major
purposes animating the tenants’ rights revolution. Subsection 1 analyzes the
legalistic, modernizing narrative of these reforms as replacing a paradigm
based on estates in land with one based on contract law. Subsection 2 explores
the instrumental motivation: improving the quality of urban housing through
the agency of tenants of substandard units.72 Subsection 3 briefly sketches the
redistributive motives of some reformers. Subsection 4 considers the
humanitarian vision of these reforms as improving the lives of low-income
tenants. Finally, Subsection 5 notes an additional set of instrumental concerns
that may have motivated the reforms’ initial adoption but which soon
disappeared from discussions of landlord-tenant law. Although these goals are
superficially harmonious with one another, and indeed often invoked jointly by
advocates of the reforms, Part III will demonstrate that the full realization of
these goals may be inconsistent.
1. Modernization: Triumph of Contract over Estates in Land
Some courts and legislatures sought to explain the implied warranty of
habitability, and the process of treating it as mutual with the tenant’s duty to
pay rent, as harmonizing landlord-tenant law with broader principles of
contract law.73 Some courts undoubtedly believed that the principles embodied
in contract law were inherently fairer than the medieval property concepts that
previously governed landlord-tenant relations in general and leases in
particular. And some courts may simply have been offended by the disparity in
treatment between landlords and tenants: while the courts rigorously enforced
tenants’ obligations to pay rent with expedited procedures, landlords were
under virtually no pressure to perform their obligations to their tenants.74
This vision had the virtue of simplicity. The lease, as amended by the
implied warranty, became a contract between landlord and tenant. As with

72. Other factors also may have contributed to the reforms. Some small states with parttime legislatures often adopt uniform laws such as URLTA as an efficient way of keeping in step
with the rest of the country. Similarly, once several states’ courts had adopted the implied
warranty, other states may have followed suit absent any clear reason to make the law of their
state an outlier. None of these considerations, however, likely would have driven such a thorough
overhaul of centuries of well-settled law.
73. Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See generally
Leslie E. Gerwin, A Study of the Evolution and Potential of Landlord Tenant Law and Judicial
Dispute Settlement Mechanism in the District of Columbia, Part I: The Substantive Law and the
Nature of the Private Relationship, 26 CATH. U. L. REV. 457 (1977) (finding conformity to
modern notions of contract law was one of the key factors guiding the evolution of a new
landlord-tenant legal regime).
74. Javins, 428 F.2d at 1082 (“[T]he legislature has made a policy judgment—that it is
socially (and politically) desirable to impose these duties on a property owner—which has
rendered the old common law rule obsolete. To follow the old rule of no implied warranty of
habitability in leases would, in our opinion, be inconsistent with the current legislative policy
concerning housing standards.” (alteration in original)).
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parties to other contracts, their relationship was to be symmetrical before the
law. The courts had long provided landlords with a service essential to their
businesses: eviction procedures, operating far more expeditiously than other
civil actions, allowed landlords quickly and inexpensively to coerce and
remove any tenants not paying rent. The courts would now demand that, in
exchange for this extraordinary help in requiring tenants to perform their legal
obligations, landlords comply with the laws on health and safety. Contract law
already had a host of principles for assessing performance, handling mutual
breaches, measuring damages, and so forth. This allowed the new legal regime
to burst onto the scene fully formed, without need for the time-consuming
articulation over series of cases that had been required to transform civil rights
law and criminal procedure.
The central principles of the new regime of landlord-tenant law were as
familiar to contract law as they were alien to feudal property law.75 The
landlord’s new implied covenant of repair was made mutual with the tenant’s
covenant to pay rent.76 The tenant owed the landlord rent only as long as the
landlord maintained the premises. The landlord’s failure to maintain the
premises violated a condition to her or his right to receive rent.77
Because the contractualist view of the tenants’ rights revolution saw those
changes as ends in themselves, it did not depend on any further actions by
landlord or tenant. It did, however, depend on the courts to hew fairly closely to
established principles of contract law in deciding landlord-tenant disputes.
Their failure to do so in practice78 meant that one idiosyncratic legal regime,
based on notions of estates in land, would give way to another, based on current
public policy preferences.
This situation was anathema to contract law. The creation of a large core
of common principles of contract law had been one of the law’s great achievements in the nineteenth century.79 Given the instrumental nature of the other
three major goals of the tenants’ rights revolution, keeping landlord-tenant law
75. But see Michael Madison, The Real Properties of Contract Law, 82 B.U. L. REV. 405,
410–26 (2002) (questioning whether the new regime of landlord-tenant law is true to contract
principles); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM.
L. REV. 773, 820–34 (2001) (positing a more complex allocation of functions between property
and contract).
76. Rome v. Walker, 196 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972).
77. The purely contractual rights tenants received with the implied covenants of repair are
occasionally confused with rights tenants received at approximately the same time to participate in
code enforcement proceedings. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.530(3)–(5) (West 2006); MO.
ANN. STAT. § 441.570 (West 2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-92(b) (West 2010); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 5321.07B(1) (LexisNexis 2004); Drew v. Pullen, 412 A.2d 1331, 1334 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1980); DePaul v. Kauffman, 272 A.2d 500 (Pa. 1971). Under these schemes, the
tenant essentially becomes an agent of the code enforcement system. The tenant imposes what
amounts to a penalty by depriving the landlord of rent until the landlord brings the premises up to
code. City of Lakewood v. Novak, 111 Ohio Misc. 2d 1 (Lakewood Mun. Ct. 2000).
78. See infra notes 200–203 and accompanying text.
79. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 464–68 (1973).
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in harmony with the larger body of contract law could be difficult. Although
both landlords and tenants might invoke contract principles when convenient,
the modernizing vision as an end in itself had no obvious, reliable advocates
before either legislatures or courts. Indeed, some advocates’ tactical embrace of
contract principles was so feeble that they failed to notice when contract law
reasoning offered a rebuttal to efforts to restrict the scope of the reforms.80
2. Urban Restoration: Improving Rental Housing Conditions
Some courts’ and legislatures’ goals were more instrumental; they saw the
implied warranty and its enforceability in actions for nonpayment of rent as a
means of compelling landlords to maintain their buildings up to minimum
standards of repair. Deteriorating housing conditions have serious negative
effects on surrounding communities: they depress property values and hence
property tax revenues, contribute to the spread of insect and rodent infestation,
give cities a negative image with visitors, and are correlated with crime.81
States therefore have reasons to want to ameliorate bad housing conditions
completely independent of any concern for the well-being of low-income
tenants. In this regard, these reforms sought to remedy the failures of
“inefficient and unworkable” code enforcement82 that had failed “to halt or
reverse urban blight.”83
3. Redistribution: Tapping Landlords’ Wealth to Ameliorate Tenants’ Poverty
Although underrepresented in judicial opinions, another significant force
driving the tenants’ rights revolution was a desire to redistribute power,84
wealth,85 and income86 into the hands of low-income people. Advocates saw

80. For example, contractarian concepts permeate Javins, yet the court also drops a
footnote that, in dicta, approves orders requiring tenants to continue performing their duty to pay
rent in order to litigate their landlord’s prior breach of the implied warranty of habitability. Javins
v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1083 n.67 (D.C. Cir. 1970). That requirement has no
place in contract law. See infra notes 202–203, 300–305 and accompanying text.
81. See EDWIN S. MILLS, URBAN ECONOMICS 178–79 (1st ed. 1972); James Q. Wilson &
George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety, THE ATLANTIC, Mar.
1982, at 29 (arguing that even modest defects can have devastating effects).
82. Brett R. Dick & John S. Pfarr, Jr., Detroit Housing Code Enforcement and Community
Renewal: A Study in Futility, 3 PROSPECTUS 61, 90 (1969).
83. Judah Gribetz & Frank P. Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies,
66 COLUM. L. REV. 1254, 1255 (1966); see Samuel Jan Brakel, URLTA in Operation: The Oregon
Experience, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 565, 578.
84. SAR A. LEVITAN, THE GREAT SOCIETY’S POOR LAW 177–79 (1969) (describing the
goals of the Office of Economic Opportunity’s Legal Services Program).
85. Jonathan I. Rose & Martin A. Scott, “Street Talk” Summonses in Detroit’s LandlordTenant Court: A Small Step Forward for Urban Tenants, 52 J. URB. L. 967, 979 (1975) (noting
the Marxist critique of housing markets that society should provide housing without profit);
Myron Moskovitz & The Nat’l Hous. & Econ. Dev. Law Project, Moving Toward Tenant Control
of Housing, in TENANTS AND THE URBAN HOUSING CRISIS 203 (Stephen Burghardt ed., 1972).
86. Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing
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landlords’ property rights, and tenants’ lack of such rights, as defining broader
status relationships.87 Redistributivists believed that landlords charged
exorbitant rents and sought public intervention to transfer some of this value
back to tenants.88 They sought to increase the bargaining power of tenants,
especially poor tenants, relative to their landlords.89 Where tenants’ only legal
remedy against their landlords had previously been costly and ineffective
affirmative suits for damages (which, absent implied covenants of habitability,
might have to be based on relatively far-fetched tort theories) they could not
expect to have much effect on the landlords’ behavior. The threat of cutting off
all rent revenues to a non-repairing landlord, however, when backed by law
limiting the recoverability of that rent, would have to be taken much more
seriously and would be much more likely to motivate landlords to make
concessions to their tenants in the form of needed repairs. Many
redistributivists saw the implied warranty of habitability and related doctrines
not as ends in themselves but as necessary complements to achieving rent control90 and other policies that more directly redistributed wealth.
Even on the left, however, this view was controversial: some felt that
targeting landlords for redistribution diverted low-income people’s attention
from the system as a whole.91 Some critics also saw legalization and
institutionalization as sapping the tenants’ rights movement’s vital strength and
paving the way for a backlash.92
4. Humanitarianism: A Better Life for Low-Income Tenants
One need not favor general redistribution of income to seek to ameliorate
the most severe forms of hardship. Although this country’s politics have
staunchly rejected broad governmental redistribution of income, middle-class
voters have been much more sympathetic to efforts to prevent hunger,
homelessness, and other forms of extreme hardship. This is true even where the
required market intervention causes significant economic inefficiency.93 Nonredistributivist humanitarians have, however, faced the administrative
challenge of limiting their interventions to those most in need and the political

Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093, 1096, 1195
(1971).
87. Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor
Tenants’ Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533, 571–75 (1992).
88. Rose & Scott, supra note 85, at 977.
89. Beattie, supra note 35, at 240.
90. See, e.g., Scofield v. Berman & Sons, Inc., 469 N.E.2d 805, 812 (Mass. 1984); Rose &
Scott, supra note 85, at 971 n.18.
91. PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 70, at 20–21.
92. Id. at xxii.
93. See JANET POPPENDIECK, SWEET CHARITY? EMERGENCY FOOD AND THE END OF
ENTITLEMENT 141–52 (1998) (describing longstanding political enthusiasm for inefficient
commodity distribution programs).
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challenge of convincing policymakers and the public that they are not
redistributivists.
Similarly, the desire to improve housing conditions is not necessarily the
same as improving the lot of the tenants in that housing. Urban renewal in the
1960s addressed decrepit housing conditions by evicting tenants and
demolishing their former homes. The HOPE VI program, developed in the
1990s to convert public housing projects into mixed-income developments,
took a similar approach, demolishing many units of decaying but inexpensive
housing.94 This eliminated the bad housing, but the tenants in those
neighborhoods were no longer around to enjoy whatever replaced it. Thus, the
instrumentalist desire to press landlords to repair their dwellings is not
necessarily pro-tenant even though it may depend heavily on tenants raising
and winning habitability claims. Evicting low-income tenants and converting
their former homes into well-maintained housing for the affluent would meet
only the narrow objective of eliminating decrepit housing conditions, not the
humanitarian goal of ameliorating tenants’ hardships.
An important objective of the reforms was to improve the lives of the
most hard-pressed tenants.95 Although framed in terms of expanding tenants’
rights, these rights existed to serve some purpose. Just as the civil rights
movement won rights that people of color could use to improve their wellbeing, so too this vision of the tenants’ rights movement sought to give lowincome tenants greater rights against their landlords, thus offering the means
for those tenants to improve their standard of living.
5. Social Stability
Although some jurisdictions were moving to recognize the implied
covenant of habitability in residential leases in the early 1960s,96 the urban riots
of the mid-1960s put housing law “into a completely new perspective.”97
Studies done immediately after the riots indicated that bad housing conditions
were a major cause of the disturbances.98
Here, too, the parallel between the two legal revolutions persisted as the
welfare system took much of the blame for the disturbances.99 In both
instances, however, when major unrest did not recur after 1968, social peace
rapidly disappeared from policy discussions.

94. David D. Troutt, Katrina’s Window: Localism, Resegregation, and Equitable
Regionalism, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1109, 1140 (2008).
95. Schier, supra note 35, at 227.
96. See, e.g., Pines v. Perssion, 111 N.W.2d 409 (Wis. 1961).
97. Beattie, supra note 35, at 242–44.
98. Rose & Scott, supra note 85, at 968 n.8; “[G]rievances related to housing were
important factors” fomenting discontent and leading to the riots. KERNER COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 69, at 472–73 (1968).
99. KERNER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 69, at 457.
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B. Requirements for the New Regime’s Success
Under the new landlord-tenant regime, tenants can bring repair disputes to
court either offensively or defensively. Once the courts or legislature imply a
warranty of habitability into residential leases, tenants in bad housing may sue
their landlords for damages;100 some jurisdictions will also grant equitable
relief to such tenants. In practice, however, most tenants remaining in bad
housing lack the legal or economic resources to sue affirmatively. As a result,
the best chance for repairs to be adjudicated is in connection with an
affirmative defense or counterclaim to the landlord’s action for possession for
nonpayment of rent.101 If the tenant can prove the existence of defects in the
premises, the court should determine that she or he does not owe some or all of
the rent the landlord claims. By grafting the new rights onto the existing
statutory eviction procedures, which in most jurisdictions were already required
to be heard and decided on an accelerated schedule, the legislatures and courts
could hope for quick action against non-repairing landlords. Speed is important
not just for the humanitarian imperative of correcting hazardous living
conditions but also to give tenants sufficient incentives to assert their new legal
rights in court. Faced with the prospect of a protracted legal battle with their
landlords before any hope of getting repairs, most tenants in houses and
apartments with serious health and safety hazards would be much more
inclined to move.
Inducing landlords to repair their units, however, is by no means as simple
as revising substantive legal rules. The effectiveness of the reforms in changing
landlords’ behavior depends on changing landlords’ economic incentives,
which in turn depends in part on how effective low-income tenants are in
asserting their new rights in court. Landlords have no incentive to maintain
their units unless the cost of failing to do so exceeds the cost of repairs. The
cost of failing to repair in the new legal regime depends upon four factors: the
probability that a tenant in a substandard unit would assert her or his new legal
rights, the probability that the tenant would be successful in doing so, and the
cost of being held liable for failure to repair, all offset by any increase in the
building’s value resulting from the repairs.102 Economic incentives were also
important in the welfare rights context: the administrative fair hearings at the
heart of the welfare rights revolution failed to achieve their promise in

100. See, e.g., Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202 (Vt. 1984) (recognizing affirmative suit to
recover rent previously paid).
101. Put another way, less expected benefit than will be required to justify an affirmative
suit will be sufficient to make defensive invocation of the warranty cost-effective.
102. Thus, repairing is only likely to be economically superior to ignoring a violation if:
(ProbabilityTenant asserts warranty x ProbabilityTenant prevails x CostLoss) + ∆ ValueBuilding >
CostRepairs.
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significant part because the consequences for eligibility workers of losing the
few hearings held were too minimal to influence behavior.103
The landlord’s incentive to repair depends heavily upon the actions of
both the tenant and the court.104 In addition, both the landlord’s actions and
their consequences, for tenants and for the housing stock, depend on several
crucial assumptions about housing markets and the nature of contemporary
poverty. The following sections examine these prerequisites to the new
regime’s success.
1. Tenants’ Propensity to Assert the Warranty of Habitability
The probability that the tenant in an ill-repaired unit will assert the
warranty of habitability depends on the tenant knowing about the warranty,
knowing how to raise it, and deciding that doing so is in her or his interest.
Thus, increasing the number of low-income tenants aware of the warranty of
habitability and how to assert it may increase the likelihood that landlords will
be motivated to make repairs. Who might provide this information, however, is
an open question. The appellate courts that announced the warranty of
habitability in most states generally lack the facilities and inclination to conduct
community legal education.105 State legislatures could finance such efforts, but
even in those states where landlords could not block the warranty of
habitability, they may have sufficient influence to prevent legislatures from
funding outreach campaigns. Legal services and community organizations
concerned about housing quality provide outreach in some areas, but these
efforts are uneven and typically underfunded.106 Ultimately, awareness of the
warranty depends heavily upon tenants learning about it through word-ofmouth. And the likelihood that tenants aware of the warranty will pass that
information along likely depends on how useful the warranty has seemed to

103. Super, Efficient Rights, supra note 5, at 1086–89.
104. The state of the real estate market in the area is also important. The repairs are more
likely to add to the value of the property if the location is desirable enough to compete for tenants
or buyers that would pay more for a better-maintained structure. In depressed areas, tenants may
simply lack the funds to pay more rent for a better unit: their demand curve may become almost
perfectly elastic at some point. For example, when the author worked as a legal services lawyer in
impoverished North Philadelphia, his clients’ rent typically was five or ten dollars per month
below the maximum public assistance grant amount. In this sense, the warranty of habitability is
most likely to prove effective not in the troubled neighborhoods that typify deteriorating housing
conditions to many but in more affluent areas where market forces already are providing landlords
significant motivation.
105. General consumer protection laws may require landlords to give tenants some
information about their rights when seeking to collect rent. Mary B. Spector, Tenants’ Rights,
Procedural Wrongs: Summary Eviction and the Need for Reform, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 135, 207–08
(2000).
106. See Super, Efficient Rights, supra note 5, at 1093–94 (describing chronic underfunding of legal services programs).
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them: tenants that have won repairs or financial recompense from their
landlords are more likely to think the information is worth sharing.
Even if a tenant in a badly repaired unit knows about the implied
warranty, she or he may not know how to raise it effectively. Initiating an
action—framing a complaint, filing the complaint and either paying the filing
fee or submitting an adequate motion for a fee waiver, arranging service of
process, and so forth—is more demanding for the novice litigant than asserting
a defense, but even the latter can be a challenge. Some courts require written
answers,107 which pro se litigants may not know how to generate. Even those
courts that allow tenants to respond orally in open court on a particular day
require a presence of mind and sense of timing that pro se litigants are likely to
lack: the tenant may have only a few seconds to decide what to say, and the
judge’s cue (such as “is this the amount you owe?”) may steer tenants into
responding to the landlord’s accounting rather than raising an affirmative
defense that may seem unresponsive. If the tenant does not understand what to
say and when, her or his abstract awareness of the defense will be for naught.
The knowledgeable tenant might decide to raise the warranty of
habitability under either of two very different sets of circumstances. First, the
tenant could raise the warranty deliberately to obtain either financial
recompense or performance of the landlord’s duty to repair. Alternatively, a
tenant in financial distress who has failed to pay rent for other reasons—such as
lack of funds or other pressing priorities—may raise the warranty in an effort to
rescue her or his tenancy. The following Subsections show that tenants who
become defendants in nonpayment actions involuntarily are far more likely to
assert the warranty and thus that the tenants’ rights revolution’s instrumental
success depends heavily on their success. Yet as Part III.A explains, littleappreciated substantive doctrines have prevented precisely these tenants from
asserting the warranty.
a. Deliberate Rent Withholding
For a tenant the rationality of deliberately asserting the warranty depends
on the likelihood that the tenant will be successful, the direct rewards (such as a
rent abatement) the tenant will receive for being successful, the likelihood that
the assertion of the warranty will cause the landlord to make repairs, the value
of the repairs, and the costs the tenant will bear in raising the warranty. A
rational tenant who knows about the warranty will choose deliberate rent
withholding over the option of continuing to pay and endure the defects when
the chances of the tenant prevailing times the benefits of prevailing—any rent

107.

BOSTON HOUS. CT. R. 3 (2009); Catelli v. Fleetwood, 842 A.2d 1078 (R.I. 2004).
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abatement plus the possibility that the landlord will make valuable repairs—
exceed the costs of raising the warranty, including the adverse consequences of
losing.108
The costs of litigation include the direct costs of advancing a defense
based on the warranty: time lost from work or other activities, fees and costs
the court charges, any costs to obtain legal advice or representation, gathering
evidence, and so on. The costs of litigation also include the chance that the
tenant will not prevail and will have to move hurriedly. Finally, they include
the chance that the landlord, although losing in the initial action, will retaliate
against the tenant by terminating her or his lease, raising the rent, changing the
locks, or taking other actions that injure the tenant or induce her or him to
move.109 Thus, the legally aware tenant of substandard housing can expect to
benefit more from raising the warranty of habitability than from suffering in
silence when the potential benefits of raising the warranty—the likelihood and
amount of any rent abatement and increased chance of getting repairs—exceed
the transaction costs of litigation and the risk and costs of defeat or those of
retaliation for a success.110
In fact, however, tenants have a third alternative besides raising the warranty of habitability and putting up with the defects: they can move. Therefore,
the rational tenant will only withhold rent when both the expected value of
doing so is positive and that expected value is greater than that of moving.111
The appearance of moving costs (including the relative quality of current
and prospective dwellings) on both sides of this calculation leads to something
of a paradox. The expected value of asserting the warranty is more likely to be
positive if the tenant is relatively willing to move. But a tenant willing to move
quickly if the warranty-based defense fails112 or if the landlord retaliates
108. Thus, the tenant will choose to withhold rent only when:
(ProbTenant prevails x ValueDamages for prevailing tenant) + (ProbTenant prevails x ProbRepairs x
ValueRepairs) > CostLitigation.
109. The landlord may evict the tenant even more suddenly through self-help. In most
jurisdictions, this is unlawful. But under a similar calculation, a landlord may conclude that the
likelihood of the tenant suing and winning, and the amount the tenant is likely to recover in such a
suit, is insufficient to dissuade her or him from engaging in self-help.
The tenant’s burdens of litigation also include losses of value in the leasehold from the
landlord’s unpleasant actions that fall short of compelling the tenant to move.
110. Accordingly, raising the warranty is advantageous only when:
(ProbTenant prevails in initial action x ValueDamages for prevailing tenant) + (ProbTenant prevails in initial action x
ProbRepairs x ValueRepairs) > ((1-ProbTenant prevails in initial action) x (CostMoving + ValueCurrent
dwelling – ValueNew dwelling)) + (ProbTenant prevails in initial action x (1-ProbTenant avoids retaliation) x
(CostMoving + ValueCurrent dwelling – ValueNew dwelling)) + Direct CostLitigation.
111. Specifically, we can expect a tenant to assert the warranty only when:
(ProbTenant prevails in initial action x ValueDamages for prevailing tenant) + (ProbTenant prevails in initial action x
ProbRepairs x ValueRepairs) – ((1-ProbTenant prevails in initial action) x (CostMoving + ValueCurrent
dwelling – ValueNew dwelling)) – (ProbTenant prevails in initial action x (1-ProbTenant avoids retaliation) x
(CostMoving + ValueCurrent dwelling – ValueNew dwelling)) – Direct CostLitigation > CostMoving +
ValueCurrent dwelling – ValueNew dwelling.
112. Indeed, even if the tenant’s defense succeeds, the landlord or code enforcement
authorities may require the tenant to move to facilitate repairs. Knott v. Laythe, 674 N.E.2d 660
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successfully, may find moving without asserting the warranty a more reliable
and efficient method of escaping a substandard dwelling.113
Thus, in a market where moving is fairly inexpensive, tenants in bad
housing might be less afraid to fight but still prefer to move because they have
a substantial chance of finding better housing. There, tenants’ mobility rather
than the warranty of habitability is likely to be the principal engine driving
improvements in housing quality. This does not seem problematic, as the ease
of moving suggests that, at least in the short term, the market is giving tenants
some leverage.
On the other hand, in a tight housing market, tenants of substandard
housing may feel they dare not assert the warranty because the likelihood they
will end up somewhere worse is high. As a result, for the warranty of
habitability to have a significant impact on housing conditions, raising it may
need to be affirmatively attractive or only modestly costly; that raising it is
simply less costly than enduring defective housing likely will not suffice. Thus,
inducing tenants in tight housing markets to assert the warranty requires highly
favorable values for the other elements in the calculation, including the tenant’s
chances of winning in the initial action and in avoiding retaliation, the damages
(or rent abatement) awarded, and the likelihood that the landlord will repair. As
Subsection 2 shows, this combination of circumstances is quite unlikely.
The importance of moving costs in this calculation also tends to skew the
warranty’s impact in favor of better-off tenants, undermining the reforms’
instrumental goals. For many of the poorest tenants, a significant part of the
cost of moving is finding the funds to make a deposit on a new dwelling before
they receive back their deposit on their current unit. If these tenants have to
borrow in the illicit credit market or expend one of the finite favors they can
call in from family or friends, the effective interest rate is likely to be
exorbitant.114 In contrast, better-off tenants may either be able to pay the second
(Mass. App. Ct. 1997); Creekside Apartments v. Poteat, 446 S.E.2d 826 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994); see
Lau v. Bautista, 598 P.2d 161 (Haw. 1979) (finding a statutory right to relocation assistance in
such a case); cf. Allen v. Lee, 538 N.E.2d 1073 (Ohio. Ct. App. 1987) (affirming award of moving
costs against landlord).
113. Moreover, moving on the tenant’s own timetable is likely to be less costly, both in
direct costs and in the tenant’s ability to obtain better new housing, than hurried moving should
the tenant lose the initial case or the landlord effectively retaliate. See Chester Hartman & David
Robinson, Evictions: The Hidden Housing Problem, 14 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 461 (2003)
(finding correlation between forced evictions and homelessness); Nan Marie Astone & Sara S.
McLanahan, Family Structure, Residential Mobility, and School Dropout, 31 DEMOGRAPHY 575
(1994) (finding that greater residential mobility explains much of the higher dropout rate of
children in stepparent families). Evictions commonly bring severe collateral consequences. Mary
Spector, Tenant Stories: Obstacles and Challenges Facing Tenants Today, 40 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 407 (2006). Thus, ease of moving is more likely to make departure appealing than it is to
make the risk of withholding rent acceptable.
114. Friends and family may not explicitly charge interest, but meeting their expectations
of reciprocity may be costly and failing to do so even costlier if the tenant encounters another
emergency.
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deposit themselves or access cheaper credit.115 As a result, less-impoverished
tenants, even if living in units with less-severe problems, may nonetheless be
more willing to chance raising the warranty of habitability. Because it is poorer
tenants that are most likely to live in substandard housing, the reduced
probability that they will feel comfortable raising the warranty of habitability is
likely to reduce the warranty’s effectiveness in remedying the worst housing
conditions.
Several additional observations are in order here. First, increasing the
likelihood that tenants with meritorious claims will prevail does more than
increase the likelihood that other tenants will become aware of the warranties:
by increasing these aware tenants’ expectations of success it also increases the
likelihood that they will elect to press claims based upon those warranties.
Thus, the success rate of tenants in substandard dwellings is doubly important
in persuading landlords to prefer repairing to litigation.116
Second, this calculus is unlikely to yield the same result for all repairs or
all landlords. Defects that are relatively inexpensive to fix, either because of
their nature or because a particular landlord has an efficient system for making
repairs, are more likely to be repaired even in a system that generates
insufficient pressure to make costlier repairs cost-effective. As a result, the
costs to the landlord of losing, and the value to the tenant of winning, a case
under the warranty of habitability presumably should vary with the severity of
the defect. The severity of a defect’s impact on the tenant’s enjoyment of the
premises, however, will not always correspond to the cost of repairing the
defect: exposed wiring could cause horrific harm to small children yet be
inexpensive to repair, while repairing an isolated unevenness in the floor that
creates a slight tripping hazard might require ripping up the entire floor and
replacing support beams below. The warranty thus will tend to promote costbeneficial repairs just as a well-functioning market would. Some defects also
may be more difficult or costly for tenants to prove, such as inadequate heat or
some kinds of infestation. Landlords that might repair obvious holes in walls
and exposed wiring might prefer to contest claims of defects that tenants cannot
as readily photograph. This effect may mimic the effects of information costs in
a market.117
Third, the value to the tenant of any repairs increases with the time the
tenant remains in the dwelling. Most repairs require many months of enjoyment

115. To be sure, better-off tenants may have more possessions that would need to be
moved and that could be lost or damaged in a move. They might also lose more wages if they
must miss work to move. Nonetheless, these costs seem unlikely to have as severe a deterrent
effect as the risk of homelessness would have on lower-income tenants.
116. On the other hand, if many tenants prevail on unsound assertions of the warranty of
habitability, landlords may conclude that repairing will not help to avoid such losses.
117. See Rabin, supra note 23, at 580 (endorsing the implied warranty only for latent
defects).
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for raising the warranty to be cost-effective to the tenant. Therefore, the
strength and duration of tenants’ protections against retaliatory evictions are
pivotal to the results.118
Finally, tenants’ behavior in these matters is unlikely to be consistently
rational. As one long-time tenants’ lawyer remarked, “nothing gets people
where they live like getting them where they live.”119 Thus, some tenants may
be extremely risk averse and decline to pursue the warranty even if the actuarial
value of doing so exceeds that of passivity. Conversely, some tenants may
become so incensed about a landlord’s failure to repair—particularly if they see
defects in their unit threatening the well-being of their children—that they may
tilt at their landlords despite meager prospects for success. Nonetheless, given
the high stakes, most tenants, particularly the poorest tenants, are likely to be
quite risk-averse and hesitant to assert the warranty to confront their landlords
over repairs unless the balance of risks and benefits seems heavily in favor of
doing so. Absent a high likelihood of success or heavy financial penalties
against landlords for the failure to repair, this will be difficult to achieve,
particularly for tenants in the worst housing.
b. Raising the Warranty to Defend Unintended Arrears
Because tenants in defective housing may justifiably decline to raise the
warranty of habitability as part of a deliberate strategy, the warranty’s
effectiveness in improving housing conditions depends largely on tenants
raising the warranty to defend non-intentional rent arrears. If the tenant lacks
the money to pay the contract rent, she or he no longer has the option of staying
and putting up with the defect. This makes the cost of moving less
determinative: whether the tenant raises the warranty and fails or raises no
defense at all, she or he is likely to have to move by approximately the same
date.120 Even if the tenant prevails and then becomes subject to the landlord’s
retaliation, she or he will surely have at least somewhat longer to move—as

118. Many states prohibit retaliatory terminations to buttress code enforcement programs
and the new tenants’ rights. URLTA § 5.101; see, e.g., Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 699–703
(D.C. Cir. 1968). Proving the landlords’ motives is difficult, however, particularly for pro se
tenants and those in systems without meaningful discovery. Kathleen Eldergill, The Connecticut
Housing Court: An Initial Evaluation, 12 CONN. L. REV. 296, 311–12 (1980). Courts may
presume the legitimacy of landlords’ terminations, in all cases or those not immediately following
the tenants’ assertion of rights. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-20 (2006) (prohibiting
rent increases, service cuts, or evictions within six months of a tenant’s efforts to enforce housing
codes); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5720(2) (West 2000) (presuming non-retaliation if
landlord waits ninety days to evict the tenant).
119. Marilyn T. Mullane, now executive director of Michigan Legal Services, made this
observation to the author while he was a law student.
120. In many states, statute fixes the length of time a tenant has to move after the landlord
wins possession. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5744 (West 2000) (allowing ten days
to move after judgment). Thus, even if the tenant alienates the landlord or the court by raising the
warranty, the court has little opportunity to punish the tenant.
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well as whatever rent abatement she or he won. Thus, a tenant’s risk aversion,
which plays a crucial role in determining which tenants will deliberately
withhold rent, is largely irrelevant to whether she or he will raise the warranty
to defend an inadvertent arrear. In addition, because these tenants need only
learn of the implied warranty before they respond to the landlord’s eviction
action, the courts have greater ability to ensure that tenants are informed in the
early stages of the proceeding.121
As a result, a rational tenant in substandard housing who has fallen behind
on rent and is aware of the warranty of habitability will invoke it if the
expected gains from appearing and defending exceed the costs of doing so
(perhaps lost time from work, child care costs, or transportation expenses).122
These direct costs are only a subset of the costs tenants contemplating
deliberate withholding must weigh, meaning that a much more modest rate of
success in the courts may justify expending modest litigation costs. On the
other hand, rent abatements may have less value to involuntary defendants than
to deliberate rent withholders. The latter will benefit from any rent abatement,
large or small. An impoverished tenant who cannot afford to pay the contract
rent, on the other hand, will benefit only from a rent abatement large enough to
bring the cost of redeeming possession within her or his means. Thus, for
example, an $800 abatement from a $1,000 rent claim may seem very favorable
for the tenant. But if the tenant lacks the remaining $200 to redeem possession,
she or he will have to move just as surely as if she or he had won no abatement
at all.
Impoverished tenants raising the warranty defensively after falling behind
on their rent involuntarily are pivotal to the success of the warranty of
habitability. This aligns tenants’ incentives well with the new regime’s housing
quality aims: unlike the case of tenants contemplating deliberate withholding,
involuntary defendants in the worst housing presumably have the greatest
chances of success.123 And as involuntary defendants likely are poorer as a

121. The Michigan Supreme Court found an innovative approach by inserting information
on these rights on summonses used in Detroit for eviction cases and on optional form notices to
quit that the courts made available to landlords. See Rose & Scott, supra note 85, at 1019. After a
few years, when reorganizing the Detroit courts, the justices did not require the new eviction court
to retain the informational forms. See also Lynn E. Cunningham, Procedural Due Process Aspects
of District of Columbia Eviction Procedures, 7 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 107, 113 (2005)
(arguing for the requirement that landlords plead compliance with the implied warranty).
122. Legally aware tenants in this position should raise the warranty whenever:
(ProbTenant prevails in initial action x ValueDamages for prevailing tenant) + (ProbTenant prevails in initial action x
ProbRepairs x ValueRepairs) > Direct CostLitigation.
Indeed, this may understate the desirability of invoking the warranty because doing so might
induce the landlord to settle for additional time to move. This serves the instrumental purpose of
promoting repairs, as it at least modestly increases landlords’ costs of not repairing.
123. To be sure, non-repairing landlords feel losses attributable to the warranty of
habitability only if their tenants redeem possession. As noted, involuntary defendants may be less
likely to do so.
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group than deliberate rent withholders, their stronger incentives to raise the
warranty comport with the reform’s redistributive and humanitarian goals.
2. Courts’ Propensity to Rule for Tenants on Repair Defenses
In addition to its direct impact on non-repairing landlords’ incentives, the
rate of success that tenants of substandard housing enjoy when raising the
warranty of habitability is crucial both to spreading word of that defense within
the tenant community and to inducing other tenants to assert the warranty.
Uniform application of new standards may be essential to improving housing
quality without raising rents.124
As an analytical matter, this should be fairly straightforward, as the new
rules are not conceptually difficult to apply. Institutionally, however, the
tenants’ rights revolution imposed stresses that the courts hearing eviction cases
were ill-equipped to handle. Adapting to the new legal regime presented several
distinct problems. First, hearing these cases demanded far greater resources
than had been required to grant possession routinely to landlords under a legal
regime in which tenants had few defenses. Second, trying disputes about
housing conditions required very different skills than many of these courts
previously had employed. And third, the judges hearing landlord-tenant
disputes had to be willing to rule against landlords that had almost invariably
prevailed in their courts under the prior regime. In this respect, the tenants’
rights revolution was at a distinct disadvantage relative to the welfare rights
revolution. The latter created a new forum that it could design to meet its
special needs, while the former tried to repurpose an existing forum with
entrenched customs designed to perform very different functions.
In the old regime, most tenants had no defenses to eviction.125 The few
contested cases that did arise—typically challenges to the landlord’s
accounting—generally could be resolved with documents. As a result, few
judicial resources were required to resolve large numbers of cases quickly.
The new defenses of failure to repair and retaliatory eviction required
considerably more judicial resources. Because the condition of the tenant’s
dwelling, or the landlord’s intent in terminating the tenancy, could raise
genuine issues of fact, the right to a jury trial suddenly was no longer
hypothetical. Although these cases remained quite simple even relative to the
small civil cases and misdemeanors the same courts typically handled, the

124. See Ackerman, supra note 86, at 1108 (arguing that comprehensive rather than
selective code enforcement will increase housing quality but not rents).
125. Marilyn Miller Mosier & Richard A. Soble, Modern Legislation, Metropolitan Court,
Minuscule Results: A Study of Detroit’s Landlord-Tenant Court, 7 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 8, 10–
12 (1973); cf. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 64–65 (1972) (discussing “those recurring cases
where the tenant fails to pay rent or holds over after expiration of his tenancy and the issue in the
ensuing litigation is simply whether he has paid or held over”).
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increased demand for adjudicatory resources still confronted these courts with
difficult choices.
More broadly, appellate courts and legislatures imposed the implied
warranty of habitability largely to make up for the failure of housing code
enforcement. That failure resulted in significant part from a lack of
adjudicatory resources for code enforcement. The new landlord-tenant regime
shifted this excess demand for adjudicatory resources to the courts. Judicial
adjudication, however, is much costlier than administrative processes: more
people are involved, judges and some clerks likely are better paid than
inspectors, suitable courtrooms must be constructed and maintained, and so on.
The transfer therefore increased the aggregate shortfall in resources.126 Neither
the legislatures, which could have created and funded new judgeships, nor the
appellate courts, which might have diverted resources from other classes of
cases, typically recognized this crucial condition to the success of the new legal
regime they were creating.127 Similarly, neither gave much attention to the
procedural reforms needed to make the courts accessible to unsophisticated pro
se tenants.128
Few of the courts given the responsibility of carrying out the policies
embodied in the reforms had experience handling cases of major public policy
import. Many had dockets dominated by traffic tickets, criminal arraignments,
and routine debt collection actions. By necessity, these courts had become
specialists more in the art of processing cases in volume than in resolving fine
points of justice in individual cases.129 Judges themselves admitted they
dispensed “assembly-line justice.”130 Some of the skills and techniques useful
126. To the extent the problem with administrative housing code enforcement was
corruption, transferring those responsibilities to the courts might have helped. Nonetheless, even
without being corrupt, the landlord-tenant courts remain disproportionately vulnerable to influence
from landlords and their lawyers, who typically are repeat players.
127. Many other categories in their caseloads, however, had a far higher incidence of
representation on both sides; those lawyers could be expected to exert political pressure if they felt
their interests being slighted. See Richard S. Wells, Lawyers and the Allocation of Justice, in THE
POLITICS OF LOCAL JUSTICE 149–53 (James R. Klonoski & Robert I. Mendelsohn eds., 1970).
Other categories lacking representation, such as traffic tickets, already may have been handled on
a mass basis with few additional resources available to be skimmed.
128.
By contrast, those seeking to reform government transfer programs have paid keen
attention to procedural denials of substantive rights. See David A. Super, The Quiet “Welfare”
Revolution: Resurrecting the Food Stamp Program in the Wake of the 1996 Welfare Law, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1271, 1351–70 (2004) [hereinafter Super, Quiet Revolution]; Super, Invisible
Hand, supra note 55, at 862–74.
129. ROBERT C. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE
WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2007 STATE COURT CASELOADS 3 (2009)
(Alternative subtitle: NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT), available
at http://www.ncsc.org/topics/specialty-courts/traffic-courts-and-procedures/resource-guide.aspx
(follow the hyperlink to the title) (showing that some states consign as much as 90 percent of their
civil caseloads to specialized courts of limited jurisdiction).
130. Rose & Scott, supra note 85, at 988 n.88; see id. at 987–88 (describing opacity of
court procedures and unintelligibility of jargon on court forms); Anthony Fusco, Jr. et al.,
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for efficient processing of large numbers of cases were antithetical to the goal
of finding facts, even relatively simple ones, in each case. The rapid use of
jargon and opaque procedures131 may seem relatively benign when the
bewildered tenants had no defenses to raise. Similarly, when the result in the
courtroom was virtually a foregone conclusion, having clerks explain that result
to parties and encourage them to go home—leave the court to enter a default
judgment—could save everyone time.132
For tenants to assert defenses based on the warranty or retaliation, effectively, however, they must understand the proceedings. The amounts of
money involved are likely to make retained counsel infeasible. Although the
warranty came into being at about the apogee of legal services funding, these
programs never had the resources to represent more than a small fraction of the
number of tenants being evicted from substandard housing.133 And those
tenants with meritorious defenses commonly are among the least
sophisticated.134 Many of these tenants inevitably become confused at times,
requiring judges and clerks to decide how much they are comfortable
explaining consistent with their view of the adversary process.135
Finally, implementing the new tenants’ defenses required a profound
transformation of courthouse culture. Larger landlords and many landlords’
lawyers are repeat players, well known to judges and clerks.136 Under the old
regime, the landlord receiving judgment in virtually every case was a part of
the pattern governing their interactions, almost as much as the salutation “your
Honor.” With few cases requiring judicial discretion, some judges and clerks
may have seen little harm in relaxing the barriers separating them from
landlords and their counsel. These relationships may have seemed symbiotic:
cooperative relationships with landlords and their lawyers could facilitate the
Chicago’s Eviction Court: A Tenants’ Court of No Resort, 17 URB. L. ANN. 93, 105 (1979)
(describing tenants’ befuddlement at court procedures).
131. Rose & Scott, supra note 85, at 987–88
132. See infra note 231 and accompanying text.
133. Even with a legal aid office across the hallway from the Detroit Landlord-Tenant
Court, fewer than 10 percent of tenants in 1975 had lawyers. Rose & Scott, supra note 85, at 993,
1000. Legal services never came close to being a “responsive entitlement” committed to serving
all eligible people with meritorious cases. See David A. Super, The Political Economy of
Entitlement, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 633, 654 (2004) (distinguishing between programs like legal
services that serve only an arbitrary number of people and those in which eligibility assures an
applicant service) [hereinafter Super, Political Economy].
134. The lowest-income tenants, who typically live in the worst units, also are more likely
to be marginally literate, as literacy correlates with earning capacity.
135. The substance of landlord-tenant law is far simpler than that of public welfare
programs’ rules, but most eviction courts’ procedures are more challenging for inexperienced
tenants than the inquisitorial model of public benefits fair hearings. See 7 C.F.R. § 273.15(l)-(q)
(2010) (establishing simple procedures for hearings in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP), with the hearing officer broadly responsible for ensuring full development of
the issues).
136. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95, 120 n.59 (1974) (quoting Mosier & Soble, supra note 125).
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expeditious disposition of large dockets. Elected judges may have come to
expect the support of the landlords’ bar, and that bar may have seemed a
natural pool from which to draw new judges. Repeat litigants may be among
the relatively few non-court personnel from whom judges may hope to receive
the respect and deference that often must substitute for financial compensation.
Lacking many of the trappings, and interesting cases, of higher courts, this
value should not be underestimated. Thus, some courts may be as vulnerable to
“capture” by repeat players nominally subject to their jurisdiction as are
administrative agencies.137 Even when the courts were not dealing with repeat
players, the assumption that landlords were entitled to win virtually all cases
may have induced judges and clerks to assist confused landlords in making out
the elements of their claims.138
Although landlords had no legally cognizable interest in a substantive
legal regime that assured them of virtually complete success, the social reliance
interests on all sides likely were immense. For the courts to reassert formal
roles, much less hold trials on matters that previously had been routine and
render judgments against familiar landlords, risked that landlords would
perceive the courts’ actions as personal slights. This inevitably required
considerable readjustment by all concerned. And some judges might have
found demeaning the prospect of simplifying and explaining the proceedings to
make them more intelligible to unsophisticated pro se tenants.
In addition to being trustees for finite pools of adjudicatory resources,
courts also can be seen as vendors of eviction services to landlords. Landlords
can remove their tenants through the courts or through (generally illegal) selfhelp methods. Although some landlords may always choose the courts as a
matter of principle, others may choose based on relative costs and benefits. As
such, the courts are vulnerable to competitive pressures. If the new tenants’
rights made evictions too burdensome, landlords might abandon the courts and
seek to evict their tenants themselves.139 Judges may understandably want to
avoid the resulting chaos and violence that would likely entail. Judges also may
resent the loss of prestige if litigants abandon their courts.
Thus, instead of focusing solely on adapting the courts to implement the
new reforms, judges had to worry about the effect the reforms might have on
their dockets, on their roles, and on the attitudes of landlords. These worries
undoubtedly diminished the enthusiasm with which many courts welcomed
137. See, e.g., Louis L. Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Administration, 86 HARV. L. REV.
1183, 1194–98 (1973) (explaining how administrative agencies are often captured by the
industries they regulate).
138. See infra note 231; cf., e.g., Neal v. Fisher, 541 A.2d 1314, 1320 (Md. 1988)
(describing trial judge’s declaration that he could empathize with the landlord because he was a
landlord himself).
139. See Randy G. Gerchick, Comment, No Easy Way Out: Making the Summary Eviction
Process a Fairer and More Efficient Alternative to Landlord Self-Help, 41 UCLA L. REV. 759
(1994) (analyzing summary eviction procedures as substitutes for self-help eviction methods).
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their new roles implementing public policies against bad housing conditions
and in favor of increased bargaining power for tenants.
3. Assumptions About Housing Markets and Poverty
Achieving any of the reforms’ instrumental goals depends on housing
economics. In particular, any plausible scenario in which the reforms could
improve housing conditions, redistribute wealth, or even ameliorate
humanitarian crises depends on a plausible explanation of why low-income
tenants cannot obtain better housing by spending more in the existing market.
The reforms’ advocates divided between two theories. Some maintained that
the housing market is somehow flawed in such a way that increased spending—
at least within the ranges of which most low-income tenants are capable—
cannot reliably bring better housing conditions. In this view, rents exceed those
that a well-functioning market would produce,140 and landlords are far more
profitable than generally recognized.141 The task, then, is to redistribute some
of that surplus to tenants. The alternative explanation is that the market reflects
low-income tenants’ preferences: as much as they might dislike their decrepit
dwellings, they would dislike even more the reductions in food, utility service,
or other necessities required to pay for any increase in their consumption of
housing. Put simply, low-income tenants suffer bad housing conditions because
they are too poor to afford anything more.
On closer examination, the market failure theory proves difficult to
support except in small submarkets or for relatively short intervals. It also has a
paradoxical effect on tenants’ propensity to raise the implied warranty. Yet if
one concludes that low-income tenants’ poverty is the reason they cannot avoid
bad housing conditions, the warranty of habitability could easily cause them
more harm than good. And if housing markets operate competitively in the
medium and long term, pressing landlords to repair could cause units to depart,
either upward or downward, from the low-cost rental market.
a. Bad Housing Conditions as a Result of Market Failure
Those claiming failure in the housing markets had some difficulty
specifying the nature of that failure. Some argued that many urban housing
markets had low vacancy rates and suggested that this meant tenants suffered
from a lack of competition among landlords. A true lack of competition—a
market controlled by one or a few suppliers who can insist on prices above
competitive equilibrium—is indeed a market failure, but ownership of rental

140. See Rose & Scott, supra note 85, at 977 n.46 (asserting that rents “are always more
than double [the] value of services necessary to maintain the house”); Ted R. Vaughan, LandlordTenant Relations in a Low-Income Area, in TENANTS AND THE URBAN HOUSING CRISIS 77–83
(Stephen Burghardt ed., 1972).
141. Rose & Scott, supra note 85, at 978.
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housing is more heterogeneous than that in some other major consumer
markets.142 Low vacancy rates do not necessarily result from a lack of
competition. Vacant housing causes losses for its owners, which they naturally
seek to avoid.143 A market with low vacancy rates may be one in which supply
has matched demand closely. Moreover, many cities actually had relatively
high vacancy rates during the period when the implied warranty was winning
recognition.144
Others argued that low-income tenants lacked the sophistication to
bargain effectively with their landlords, suffering a kind of information
failure.145 Thus, whether landlord or tenant is responsible for repairs would
matter because transaction costs would prevent tenants from bargaining with
their landlords in a Coasean manner for an optimal level of maintenance.
The theory that tenants lacked bargaining capacity creates something of a
paradox. As noted above, the implied warranty of habitability’s effectiveness
depends in significant part on tenants’ sophistication in learning about the
warranty and navigating court procedures to assert it effectively. The more
arduous those procedures are, the more they will deny relief to tenants whose
lack of sophistication has exposed them to the information failures
hypothesized to justify the imposition of the warranty. Thus, if the market
failure hypothesis is correct, the warranty of habitability will prove ineffectual
because tenants in substandard housing will be unlikely to raise it
successfully.146
A more sophisticated argument for market failure focuses on time.
Housing takes a fairly long time to enter the market, leaving the short-term
housing supply relatively inelastic.147 Some of the reforms’ advocates argued
that this inelasticity could be fairly persistent due to land-use controls, building
codes, expensive union “featherbedding,” and other factors.148 They did not
identify the surge in demand to which the market was failing to respond: if
anything, the decades following World War II saw a rapid shrinkage in demand
for rental housing in central cities, as much of the middle class became
suburban homeowners. Moreover, this theory creates another paradox because
142. See Ackerman, supra note 86, at 1099–100, 1149–50.
143. See Rabin, supra note 23, at 576.
144. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. AND RESEARCH,
1980 NATIONAL HOUSING PRODUCTION REPORT 43 (1980).
145. Duncan Kennedy, The Effect of the Warranty of Habitability on Low-Income Housing:
“Milking” and Class Violence, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 485, 497–98 (1987).
146. In other words, the same skills that would allow more sophisticated tenants to raise the
implied warranty of habitability successfully will, under this market failure hypothesis, allow
them to avoid living in defective housing in the first place.
147. Conversely, discrimination may deny slum landlords an alternative, more upscale
market for their units even if they repair those units. Middle-income renters will decline to live in
housing in “bad neighborhoods” even if that housing is otherwise desirable. Ackerman, supra note
86, at 1102.
148. Rose & Scott, supra note 85, at 977.
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tenants’ willingness to move affects their propensity to assert the warranty. If
tenants’ positions in the market are precarious, they presumably will be highly
averse to moving. A tenant forced to move rapidly after losing an eviction case
will be among the most vulnerable to short-term market conditions. This
paradox is partially ameliorated for impoverished tenants raising the warranty
when other financial setbacks make them involuntary defendants in eviction
proceedings. These tenants still, however, must master court procedures sufficiently to assert the warranty effectively in defending their failure to pay rent.
b. Bad Housing Conditions as a Result of Poverty
If low-income tenants’ inability to secure better housing is attributed not
to market failure but simply to their poverty, the warranty of habitability would
potentially cause low-income tenants to increase their consumption of housing.
In theory, regulatory policy that causes low-income tenants to increase their
consumption of housing need not be redistributive.149 It could, instead,
represent a judgment that they would be better off in superior housing even if
they had to sacrifice other expenditures to pay for it.150 Yet forcing tenants to
endure hunger in order to live in better apartments is hardly consistent with the
1960s notion of expanding individual rights—it is at once paternalistic,
inefficient, and cruel. Therefore, the implied warranty of habitability likely
would not have attracted any significant number of adherents absent some
argument that low-income tenants could receive better housing without
reducing their ability to purchase other necessities. The implied warranty’s
advocates developed several theories about why landlords under some
circumstances might be compelled to absorb the added costs of improved
maintenance, neither raising rents nor shrinking the supply of low-rent
housing;151 critics staunchly rejected these views.152
Allowing low-income tenants to consume more housing for the same cost
could happen if the housing supply function shifted to provide more housing at
each price.153 Such a shift would occur with a reduction in the costs of
production. Federal housing policy sought to increase production, but with
ambiguous effects. During the three decades after World War II, the federal
government subsidized the cost of supplying housing by constructing public
housing. The white middle class’s heavily subsidized abandonment of the inner
cities similarly swelled the supply of rental housing. Beginning in the Nixon

149. Ackerman, supra note 86, at 1097.
150. Neil K. Komesar, Return to Slumville: A Critique of the Ackerman Analysis of
Housing Code Enforcement, 82 YALE L.J. 1175, 1175–76 (1973).
151. Ackerman, supra note 86, at 1177; Bruce Ackerman, More on Slum Housing and
Redistribution Policy: A Reply to Professor Komesar, 82 YALE. L.J. 1194, 1198 (1973).
152. Komesar, supra note 150, at 1183; Rabin, supra note 23, at 580; RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 16.6 (6th ed. 2003).
153. In other words, the supply curve would shift to the right.
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Administration, however, the federal government began to change from
subsidizing supply to subsidizing individual tenants’ purchases of housing
through Section 8 vouchers and certificates.154 This allowed a minority of lowincome tenants—those receiving subsidies—to pay more for housing without
sacrificing other expenditures, but it also increased aggregate demand,
counteracting the effects of the growth in supply. Some writers suggested that
social segregation, on the other hand, would stifle demand for housing in areas
regarded as slums and inhibit landlords from exiting to compete in higherpriced markets.155
The courts adopting the tenants’ rights reforms had no way to affect the
supply of low-rent housing directly.156 State legislatures might have, but statelevel social spending initiatives of this scale were rare in this period, and the
federal government had assumed the mantle of housing financing. Thus, states’
ability to increase low-income tenants’ consumption of housing depended on
finding and exploiting some flaw in the housing market that would prevent
landlords from charging low-income tenants more for improved housing.157 It
also presumably depended on not adversely affecting the supply of low-rent
housing.
At least three features of the housing market in some places may prevent
landlords from passing along to tenants the costs of repairs compelled under the
warranty of habitability.158 First, some urban areas have rent control. The
fraction of the low-income housing market covered by rent control, however,
was modest even when the tenants’ rights revolution was taking shape and has
steadily declined since.159 Still, if landlords must make repairs and may not by
law increase rents, they must either absorb the cost of the repairs or take the
unit off the market.
Second, a similar effect can be achieved through fixed public assistance
grant levels. If the maximum monthly welfare grant for a family of three is
$400, and a substantial fraction of low-income tenants receive welfare,
landlords may not be able to charge more than that amount for two-bedroom
units whose size or location will not attract middle-income renters.160 Thus, the
154. Super, Laboratories, supra note 37, at 585; KATZ, supra note 59, at 129–32 (2001).
155. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 86, at 1102.
156. Indirectly, however, improved maintenance increases supply by extending the life of
rental units. Kennedy, supra note 145, at 499–501.
157. See Robinson v. Diamond Hous. Corp., 463 F.2d 853, 860 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (assuming
but not explaining such market conditions).
158. Some posit that the supply of housing dropping out of higher-cost housing markets
will deny landlords the bargaining power to raise rents above their current expenses, particularly
in declining neighborhoods. Kennedy, supra note 145, at 487–88.
159. D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255, 285
(2006).
160. To be sure, landlords could increase the rent for a unit to the level of the maximum
welfare grant for the next-larger family, effectively forcing more crowding. As discussed more
fully infra Part III.C.2, this would convert one kind of bad housing, decaying conditions, into
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demand function is effectively discontinuous, with demand in the lowest
segment almost perfectly elastic with respect to price at the levels
corresponding to public assistance grant levels.161 The effect is somewhat
similar to that of rent control: if the warranty compels a landlord to make
repairs and the elasticity of demand at the public-assistance-grant level prevents
the landlord from recovering those costs, the landlord may have to choose
between absorbing the repair cost and making enough improvements to the unit
to appeal to a higher segment of the rental market.
Finally, a large proportion of landlords’ costs are fixed. The landlord
incurs the cost of capital invested in the unit, property taxes, insurance, roof
repairs, and at least enough heat to keep the pipes from freezing whether the
unit is occupied or not. Therefore, in the short term, landlords have a strong
incentive not to raise rents to the point where the unit might fall vacant, as even
a very low rent should more than cover the unit’s marginal occupancy costs.
Even in the medium term, a very slight rate of return on the landlord’s original
investment might be superior to exiting the market.162 Thus, in a housing
market with a substantial vacancy rate, the landlord in the near term may have
to absorb at least a substantial portion of the additional costs of repairs.
None of these is altogether satisfactory. The first two affect only small
segments of the rental housing market, and none of the three is reliable beyond
the short term. In addition, even if these or other factors prevent landlords from
passing along the full cost of additional repairs, tenants may not be better off.
Low-income tenants with very tight budgets may face serious hardship if their
housing costs increase, even if the value they receive far exceeds the price.163
Getting a $5,000 ocean cruise for $100 sounds like a great deal—unless that
$100 is needed to prevent a utility shut-off, to pay for cardiac medication, or
the like. Moreover, even where market conditions prevent increases in price,
they typically lead to a reduction in the number of units entering the market
when the costs of production rise. Even if landlords could not raise rents in the
near term, a reduction in the supply of low-cost housing could result in
overcrowding, homelessness, and tenants exiting the affected market to
compete for housing in higher-cost or physically remote rental markets.
another, overcrowding.
161. A similar effect could be achieved by assuming absolute uniformity in the housing
stock and in the effectiveness of regulations requiring better maintenance. Ackerman, supra note
86, at 1109.
162. Id. at 1103.
163. See id. at 1120. The total monetary value conferred on tenants, or the value of tenants’
housing purchases, may improve if the warranty compels landlords to make repairs that improve
the quality of the unit by more than the cost they pass along to tenants. See also Richard Craswell,
Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43
STAN. L. REV. 361, 398 (1991). Tenants’ aggregate welfare, however, could readily decline if the
incremental value of the housing gained is less than that of the goods or services sacrificed to
purchase it. Narrow, monetary calculations of low-income people’s well-being can stoke
humanitarians’ suspicions of redistributionalists. See supra Part I.A.4.
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Even if landlords cannot pass along all, or even some, of the cost of
repairs, they have two additional options in the medium and long term besides
defying the warranty or making the repairs the warranty commands. They may
disinvest in the property to the point that it falls out of the rental market
completely through abandonment or arson. Or they may make substantial new
investments in the property to move it out of the lowest-rent segment of the
market.
Thus, the landlords’ decision function described above is incomplete—it
considers only two of at least four options.164 To improve the lives of tenants,
the option of repairing must not only become more attractive to landlords than
ignoring the implied warranty, it must also prevail over both disinvestment and
moving the unit into a higher-cost housing market, either as a rental or through
conversion to a condominium or cooperative. Indeed, in order to achieve a
socially beneficial outcome, enough landlords must decide to repair to make the
improvement in tenants’ lives offset the harm experienced by those
unsuccessful in asserting the warranty of habitability, who will have forfeited
the economic and noneconomic costs of litigation and moving, as well as the
adverse consequences of reducing the supply of low-cost housing.165
Here, too, a paradox arises affecting tenants’ propensity to assert the
warranty. If a significant number of landlords remove units from the market
rather than repair them, the supply of low-rent housing will decline, the cost of
moving will increase, and fewer tenants will be inclined to assert the warranty.
More generally, as the low-rent housing market tightens, any economic
pressures on landlords to maintain their dwellings as a way of attracting
tenants, as well as market pressures not to raise rents to cover the costs of
repairs or otherwise, will largely disappear. Decrepit housing may well
disappear, which may satisfy those who saw the warranty as a response to
urban blight. But the results will bitterly disappoint redistributivists and
humanitarians, who will see the benefit of improved housing accrue not to lowincome tenants but to middle- and upper-income gentrifiers.
C. Conclusion
The implied warranty’s success in improving decrepit housing units or in
improving the well-being of their tenants depends upon a series of factors,
several of which are highly problematic. Those tenants most affected may not
be aware of their rights, may lack the sophistication to assert those rights

164. Landlords could also sell their units to other landlords who can make repairs or
prosecute eviction actions more efficiently. This may resolve some borderline cases but still
leaves the overall picture essentially unchanged.
165. When the implied warranty was new, one could imagine the government making up
for the loss of supply of low-income housing. See Ackerman, supra note 86, at 1113–19. This,
however, might have proved administratively difficult and could be less efficient than a direct
cash transfer program. Komesar, supra note 150, at 1178 n.8, 1180–83.
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effectively, or may decline to raise the warranty either because they are
unwilling to risk having to move or because they prefer moving to investing
resources fighting over their current abode. The warranty’s effectiveness
therefore is likely to depend heavily on having tenants raise the warranty
defensively after falling behind on their rent. Even then, the ability of low-level
courts to transform the way they handle landlord-tenant cases is pivotal.
II.
FLAWS IN THE NEW REGIME
Like the welfare rights revolution, the tenants’ rights revolution suffered
from deep normative ambivalence that led to rules sharply limiting its practical
impact. Courts and legislatures did not match the attention they devoted to the
broad strokes of reforming substantive landlord-tenant law with similar focus
on the finer points of the doctrine or the procedural and institutional steps
required to ensure that the implied warranty would improve either substandard
housing or the lives of the tenants of those units. The ensuing problems have
resulted in extremely low rates of success for tenants with meritorious claims
under the implied warranty of habitability. In particular, these policies have
tended to prevent tenants from raising the implied warranty defensively. Given
the previously described difficulty of inducing tenants to challenge their
landlords’ repair records affirmatively, excluding impoverished tenants
defending nonpayment actions has severely undermined the new regime of
landlord-tenant law, rendering it irrelevant or even counter-productive with
respect to many of the problems it set out to address. Moreover, the regime’s
failure has disproportionately afflicted the lowest-income tenants whose plight
helped drive the transformation of the substantive law.
Section A describes some important formal limitations on tenants’ ability
to assert the implied warranty of habitability, one substantive, the other
procedural. Section B then summarizes what is known about how the courts
have actually handled eviction cases under the new legal regime. It finds that an
array of procedural obstacles have rendered the implied warranty of habitability
almost irrelevant in practice, with tenants prevailing far too rarely to induce
other tenants to learn about and raise the new defenses or to induce landlords to
increase their maintenance efforts.
A. Formal Limitations on the New Rules
An initial substantive challenge the new regime faced came from
landlords’ efforts to waive the implied warranty through explicit lease terms.
Competition for lease terms is rare even in otherwise competitive rental
housing markets;166 this lack of competition should allow many landlords to
impose such terms. Tenants in the worst housing, who may be the least
166.

Rabin, supra note 23, at 582–83.
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sophisticated and have fewer alternatives, may be the most susceptible to
demands that they sign such leases. Many states recognized that reading an
implied warranty of habitability into leases that was waivable would
accomplish little.167 Yet even unenforceable lease terms may compound
tenants’ confusion about their rights.168 Only a few jurisdictions sought
affirmatively to deter landlords from including such terms.169
Even without these lease terms, however, the new regime of landlordtenant law created asymmetry between landlord and tenant in two subtle but
important respects.170 First, many jurisdictions impose substantive rules that
effectively prevent tenants from challenging the landlord’s breach of the
implied warranty of habitability without deliberate preparation.171 Such rules
make the defense difficult for a hard-pressed tenant who misses a rental
payment and must defend a possessory action for nonpayment of rent. Second,
most jurisdictions require tenants raising warranty of habitability defenses to
deposit with the court contract rent as it comes due. This effectively excuses the
landlord’s breach of her or his covenant of repair unless the tenant continues to
perform her or his covenant to pay rent.
Although contract law has never been perfectly symmetrical—and
certainly is not so today—none of these rules has obvious roots in contract law.
Instead, they appear to be products of social engineering or hesitation about
imposing the warranty of habitability. On the other hand, they are not
necessarily offensive to the contractualist, or modernizing, vision of the new
regime of landlord-tenant law. After all, the warranty of habitability was read
into contracts reached between landlord and tenant that contained no such
provision. Each of these rules could be framed as additional implied warranties
from the tenant or as limitations on the landlord’s warranty that the law reads
into residential leases.

167. See, e.g., Leardi v. Brown, 474 N.E.2d 1094, 1099–1100 (Mass. 1985); Fair v.
Negley, 390 A.2d 240, 243 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978); Curtis J. Berger, Hard Leases Make Bad Law,
74 COLUM. L. REV. 791 (1974) (describing how judges find ways to rule in favor of tenants when
their leases waive rights to which they are entitled); Bailey Kuklin, On the Knowing Inclusion of
Unenforceable Contract and Lease Terms, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 845, 886 n.132 (1988). But see P.H.
Inv. v. Oliver, 818 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Utah 1991) (allowing waivers); Odneal v. Wolfe, 1980 WL
351332, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980) (treating tenant’s move into the premises as admission of their
habitability); cf., Pierre v. Williams, 431 N.Y.S.2d 249, 250–51 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1980) (enforcing
lease term waiving right to jury trial).
168. Kuklin, supra note 167, at 868.
169. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 554.633(1)(a), 554.636 (West 2005); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5321.13(E), 5321.14(A) (LexisNexis 2004).
170. Some states imposed other limitations on the new regime, such as limits on which
defects could justify a defense to a nonpayment action. See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §
92.052–.058 (West 2007).
171. An extreme version of this approach is Foisy v. Wyman, 515 P.2d 160, 168 (Wash.
1973), in which the court prohibited the defensive invocation of the warranty of habitability unless
the tenant is entitled to a complete rent abatement, or somehow calculated and paid the portion of
rent not meriting abatement.
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The impact of these rules on the tenants’ rights revolution’s instrumental
goals, however, is profound. Although other factors intervened to help reshape
the low end of the housing market and the lives of low-income renters, these
rules alone likely would have sufficed to distort severely the impact of the
tenants’ rights revolution. This Section describes these rules and considers how
they may rearrange the incentives analyzed in Part II above.
1. The Requirement that Rent Withholding Be Deliberate
Most states effectively require tenants invoking the implied warranty of
habitability to demonstrate that their sole motive in failing to pay rent was to
raise repair issues.172 These rules commonly are described as requiring the
tenant to show “good faith.” Some commentators suggest that tenants who have
failed to pay rent for some reason other than the landlord’s failure to repair
should perhaps be barred from raising the habitability defense as a “legal
afterthought.”173 Some states enact such a bar explicitly, even requiring an
affidavit that the tenant has taken five specified preparatory steps.174 One state
imposes monetary penalties on tenants who withhold rent absent strict
compliance with statutory conditions.175
The most common method of ascertaining that the tenant’s invocation of
the warranty was deliberate is to require the tenant to prove that she or he gave
the landlord notice of any defects alleged.176 The Restatement declares that the
172. See, e.g., 280 Broad, LLC v. Adams, 2006 WL 2790909 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006)
(denying rent abatement to tenant whose furnace exploded because economic difficulties
contributed to nonpayment of rent). The state might require proof that the tenant lodged a
complaint with code enforcement agencies. See Eldergill, supra note 118, at 306. The state might
require the tenant to demonstrate that she or he has the money required to pay the rent. See, e.g.,
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.530(3) (West 2006) (establishing municipal escrow account for
this purpose). One court, however, held that tendering payment to the landlord waived the
warranty. See Eldergill, supra note 118, at 309.
173. See, e.g., Brakel, supra note 83, at 569. But cf. 279 4th Ave. Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Mollett,
898 A.2d 1036, 1039 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (reversing dismissal of tenant’s habitability
defense entered because tenant’s rent payments were late).
174. See Chernin v. Welchans, 844 F.2d 322, 324 (6th Cir. 1988) (describing Ohio’s
procedure).
175. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.058(a) (West 2007).
176. See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.052(a) (West 2007); URLTA § 4.101(a); Jesse
v. Lindsley, 233 P.3d 1, 7 (Idaho 2008); Glasoe v. Trinkle, 479 N.E.2d 915, 920 (Ill. 1985); Dulin
v. Sowell, 919 So. 2d 1010, 1012 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005); Chiodini v. Fox, 207 S.W.3d 174, 176
(Mo. Ct. App. 2006); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 75 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Marini v.
Ireland, 265 A.2d 526, 535 (N.J. 1970); N.Y.C. Hous. Auth. v. Roberts, Nos. 570853-01, 02026/027, 2002 WL 759637, at *1 (N.Y. App. Term Apr. 16, 2002); Geyer v. Frank, No. CA84-06074, 1985 WL 8144, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 14, 1985); Pugh v. Holmes, 405 A.2d 897, 906 (Pa.
1979); McIntyre ex rel. Howard v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 816 A.2d 1204, 1208 n.9 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2003); Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202, 210 (Vt. 1984); MICH. STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTION
100.01 (2010); 49 AM. JUR. 2D, Landlord & Tenant, § 450 (2010); SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 34,
§ 3:24 (1980); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY § 10.6 (2d ed. 2005). But
see OR. REV. STAT. § 90.360 (2009); Gennings v. Newton, 567 So. 2d 637 (La. Ct. App. 1990)
(rejecting notice requirement); In re Estate of Jorden, 800 N.Y.S.2d 490, 496 (N.Y. Sur. Ct.
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landlord must “keep the leased property in a condition that meets the
requirements of governing health, safety, and housing codes,”177 but grants
tenants remedies only when the “the landlord does not correct his failure within
a reasonable time after being requested to do so.”178 These requirements
migrated to the contract side of landlord-tenant law from its tort side, which
imposed liability for the landlord’s negligent disregard of known defects.179
Some courts have required more formal notice than many tenants are likely to
provide180 or sanctioned tenants for raising valid defenses without having given
their landlords notice.181
2. Landlords’ Protective Orders
Probably the most important formal limitations on the new regime of
landlord-tenant law are landlords’ protective orders (LPOs). LPOs are court
orders or statutory requirements that tenants deposit rent with the court during
the pendency of these actions as a condition to being heard on their defenses182
or receiving a jury trial.183 For more affluent tenants with incomes sufficient to
make these payments, LPOs may be mere nuisances. But for low-income
tenants, those most likely to live in slum housing, these orders may effectively
keep the implied warranty out of court. This frustrates the instrumental,
redistributive, and humanitarian goals of the new landlord-tenant regime.
Moreover, because these orders find little precedent in other areas of contract
law, they arguably preserve some of the exceptionalism that the reforms sought
to purge from landlord-tenant law.

2005); Miller v. C.W. Myers Trading Post, Inc., 355 S.E.2d 189 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (finding
notice not required for many defects); SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 34, § 3:16.
177. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, LANDLORD & TENANT § 5.5(1) (1977).
178. Id. § 5.5(4); see Moser v. Cline, 214 S.W.3d 390, 395 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (awarding
landlord double rent because tenant failed to show that delay in repairing sewer was
unreasonable); Chess v. Muhammad, 430 A.2d 928, 930 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1981) (per
curiam) (finding no breach because delay in repairs not unreasonable).
179. See Michael J. Davis & Phillip E. DeLaTorre, A Fresh Look at Premises Liability as
Affected by the Warranty of Habitability, 59 WASH. L. REV. 141, 157 (1984).
180. See, e.g., Dugan v. Milledge, 494 A.2d 1203, 1206 (Conn. 1985) (affirming dismissal
of tenants’ claims because tenant could not prove a prior complaint to housing inspectors); Myrah
v. Campbell, 163 P.3d 679, 683 (Utah. Ct. App. 2007) (finding “informal emails” and telephone
calls insufficient).
181. See, e.g., Landmarks Restoration Corp. v. Gwardyak, 485 N.Y.S.2d 917, 918–19
(N.Y. City Ct. 1985) (awarding attorneys’ fees to landlord despite tenant’s meritorious defense
and usual rule denying attorneys’ fees in contract cases).
182. See, e.g., URLTA § 4.105 (“In [the] event [the tenant counterclaims for money under
the rental agreement or the Act] the court from time to time may order the tenant to pay into court
all or part of the rent accrued and thereafter accruing, and shall determine the amount due to each
party. The party to whom a net amount is owed shall be paid first from the money paid into court,
and the balance by the other party.”).
183. See, e.g., MICH. CT. R. 4.201(H)(2) (2009).
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a. The Genesis of LPOs
LPO requirements in many jurisdictions have extensive histories going
back long before the recognition of the implied warranty of habitability and the
related defense of retaliatory eviction184—prior to which tenants had few
defenses available in eviction cases. Where “the only issue is whether the
allegations of the complaint are true,”185 an LPO has the effect only of
requiring tenants to pay an undeniable obligation.186 Similarly, when a court
requires rent payments on appeal after a trial has found that rent is owed, it
merely echoes the court’s findings and provides the landlord security against
loss during the period the appeal is pending.187 And although most jurisdictions
substantially rewrote their statutes on eviction procedure at the time they
recognized reforms, having LPO requirements in their previous statutes probably made these states more likely to continue to impose LPOs without careful
consideration of their compatibility with the new regime.188
184. See, e.g., MICH. REV. STAT., ch. 123, § 8303 (1846).
185. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 63 (1972).
186. Even before the tenants’ rights revolution, tenants could argue constructive eviction or
challenge the landlord’s assertion about the rent level. Thus, even under the old regime, “[o]f
course, it is possible for [LPOs] to be applied so as to deprive a tenant of a proper hearing in
specific situations . . . .” Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 65.
187. See, e.g., Cooks v. Fowler (Cooks I), 437 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (finding that
the equities are more likely to favor appeal bonds than pretrial LPOs); Bell v. Tsintolas Realty
Co., 430 F.2d 474, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1970). But see Cooks v. Fowler (Cooks II), 459 F.2d 1269,
1272, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (“Judicial protection of the landlord, whether pretrial or post-trial,
can be justified only within the area of fair compensation for the possession he loses during the
period of litigation. A protective order is unsustainable insofar as it requires the tenant to deposit
as security more than the landlord could legitimately claim on that account.”). Bonds imposed on
appeal from courts that do not afford the parties full trials present a somewhat different situation.
Jurisdictions utilizing these procedures typically refer eviction actions to quasi-judicial
magistrates for initial determinations. Unsuccessful parties may then “appeal” to a higher court,
where they receive a trial de novo. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-332(a), (d)
(LexisNexis 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-32 (2009). Some of the parties’ basic procedural rights,
in particular the right to a jury trial, may only be made available on this “appeal.” This caused one
court to invalidate these “appeal bonds,” Usher v. Waters Ins. & Realty Co., 438 F. Supp. 1215,
1220–21 (W.D.N.C. 1977), leading the state to exempt indigent tenants from part of the
requirement. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-34(c1).
Access to appeal can be important to counter some of the problems described infra Part II.B.
See Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 74–79 (invalidating on equal protection grounds an Oregon statute
requiring tenant-appellants to post bond for double rent to perfect an appeal); Fed. Nat’l Mortg.
Ass’n v. Wingate, 273 N.W.2d 456, 460–61 (Mich. 1979) (overturning requirement that tenants
seeking to appeal eviction orders make large cash deposits); Cooks I, 437 F.2d at 673; Cooks II,
459 F.2d at 1275–76 (vacating a trial court’s order that a tenant pay the full contract rent into court
as an appeal bond despite serious defects in the premises).
188. Commentators have been of little help. Even one of the more thorough critiques of
URLTA mentions LPOs only in passing. Richard E. Blumberg & Brian Quinn Robbins, Beyond
URLTA: A Program for Achieving Real Tenant Goals, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 9 n.39
(1976). Another major article on the tenants’ rights reforms offers an almost exclusively
descriptive summary of the then-existing law on LPOs. Myron Moskovitz, The Implied Warranty
of Habitability: A New Doctrine Raising New Issues, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1444, 1473–80, 1482–87
(1974). The one discussion specifically treating the escrow requirement in landlord-tenant
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LPOs may be attempts to appease landlords upset by the recognition of
implied covenants of habitability in residential leases, offering a pretrial rent
collection mechanism as a quid pro quo.189 This is especially true of courts that
recognized the covenants without statutory support190 and therefore are subject
to landlords’ criticism for exceeding their institutional roles.191 Some courts
seemed to believe LPOs were necessary to protect landlords’ due process
rights.192 These courts were particularly inclined to point to a perceived change
in the once summary nature of eviction proceedings,193 and to suggest that
landlords deserve assured collection of any rent owed194 as compensation for
delays.195
The courts establishing LPOs appear to have little understanding of how
these orders impact low-income tenants. While courts devote pages of meticulous legal reasoning to support their recognition of the implied covenants,196
they impose LPO requirements, often virtually without explanation, in a
paragraph197 or a footnote,198 generally as dictum.199 Some tenants’ advocates

litigation focuses on appeal bonds rather than LPOs. Comment, Landlord Protective Orders – A
Lack of Guidelines for Appellate Use, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 132 (1971).
189. See Smith v. Wright, 416 N.E.2d 655, 662 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979).
190. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1076–77, 1083 n.67 (D.C.
Cir. 1970); Hinson v. Delis, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661, 666 (Ct. App. 1972); King v. Moorehead, 495
S.W.2d 65, 75 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Pugh v. Holmes, 405 A.2d 897, 900, 907 (Pa. 1979)
(favoring, but not requiring, an escrow procedure); see also Bell v. Tsintolas Realty Co., 430 F.2d
474, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (suggesting that LPOs may be required to correct for the side effects of
“judicial innovation”).
191. See, e.g., Pugh, 405 A.2d at 903–05.
192. See, e.g., Martins Ferry Jaycee Hous., Inc. v. Pawlaczyk, 448 N.E.2d 512, 514 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1982); Rush v. S. Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 173 S.E.2d 744, 746 (Ga. Ct. App. 1970).
193. See, e.g., Bell, 430 F.2d at 481–82.
194. See id. at 479 & n.10; Green v. Superior Court, 517 P.2d 1168 (Cal. 1974); Dameron
v. Capitol House Assocs. Ltd., 431 A.2d 580 (D.C. 1981).
195. Bell, 430 F.2d at 481; KNG Corp. v. Kim, 110 P.3d 397 (Haw. 2005); Stanger v.
Ridgway, 404 A.2d 56 (N.J. Cumberland County Ct. 1979). But see Pernell v. Southall Realty,
416 U.S. 363, 371–76 (1974) (finding ancient roots for the right to trial by jury in landlord-tenant
cases). The delay argument assumes that tenants are primarily responsible for delays in the
proceedings and hence subject to deterrence, that LPOs provide effective deterrence, that shifting
the costs of delay through LPOs will not induce landlords to stall, and that the costs of the averted
delays outweigh the burdens LPOs impose. See Cunningham v. Phoenix Mgmt., Inc., 540 A.2d
1099 (D.C. 1988) (upholding dismissal of tenant’s pleadings and payment of escrow to landlord
without trial when tenant missed a payment after a year of receiving no relief on her complaints of
code violations).
196. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1072–83 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Hinson v. Delis, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661, 662–67 (Ct. App. 1972); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65,
67–77 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Pugh, 405 A.2d at 900–10.
197. See, e.g., Hinson, 102 Cal Rptr. at 666; King, 495 S.W.2d at 77; Pugh, 405 A.2d at
907.
198. See Javins, 428 F.2d at 1083 n.67.
199. See, e.g., id. at 1083 n.67; Hinson, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 666; King, 495 S.W.2d at 77;
Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114 (W. Va. 1978). Indeed, the landlord in King did not respond to
the tenant’s appeal in the Missouri Court of Appeals. King, 495 S.W.2d at 67.
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shared this lack of understanding, themselves suggesting LPOs.200 Some courts
and commentators cannot resist moralizing at tenants invoking the new
defenses, calling LPOs necessary to demonstrate their “good faith.”201
Rationales offered for LPOs expose fissures between the various purposes
of the underlying reforms. For example, those focused on the instrumental goal
of housing improvement view LPOs as creating a pool of money for repairs.202
This suggestion—that rent excused under the implied warranty should repair
the landlord’s building—certainly clashes with the redistributive goal, and lowincome tenants may face pressing humanitarian needs for which that money
could prove vital. And requiring the buyer to pay the purchase price to a
breaching seller to correct the latter’s noncompliance is hardly standard in
contract law. At most the “repairs pool” argument might justify post-judgment
escrowing of that portion of the rent not abated under the implied warranty.203
The argument most striking in its resistance to the new regime, however, was
that LPOs were needed to reduce the number of tenants asserting the new
habitability defense.204
b. Characteristics of LPOs
In general, LPOs are imposed on tenants when they raise defenses based
upon the warranty of habitability or retaliatory eviction205 or when they demand
jury trials.206 Some jurisdictions limit LPOs to “action[s] for possession based
upon nonpayment of the rent” and “action[s] for rent when the tenant is in
possession,”207 but others allow LPOs even when the landlord has not put rent

200. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 67 n.13 (1972); Javins, 428 F.2d at 1083
n.67; LaPrade v. Liebler, 614 A.2d 546 (D.C. 1992); Jackson v. Rivera, 318 N.Y.S.2d 7 (Civ. Ct.
1971); Spector, supra note 105, at 207.
201. Dameron v. Capitol House Assocs. Ltd., 431 A.2d 580, 584 (D.C. 1981); L.V.G.
Realty Corp. v. Maltez, 561 N.Y.S.2d 630, 631 (City Ct. 1990); see Emily Jane Goodman,
Housing Court: The New York Tenant Experience, 17 URB. L. ANN. 57, 59 (1979).
202. See, e.g., Scroggins v. Solchaga, 552 N.W.2d 248, 252 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996); King,
495 S.W.2d at 79; City of Mount Vernon v. Brooks, 469 N.Y.S.2d 517, 519 (City Ct. 1983); 176
East 123rd Street Corp. v. Flores, 317 N.Y.S.2d 150, 155 (Civ. Ct. 1970); Morbeth Realty Corp. v.
Velez, 343 N.Y.S.2d 406, 412 (Civ. Ct. 1973); see also Pugh, 405 A.2d at 907 (exhibiting
confusion as to which party’s interests LPOs serve).
203. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.190(a)(3) (2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 239,
§ 8A (West 2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 540:13-d(II) (LexisNexis 2006).
204. Stanger v. Ridgway, 404 A.2d 56 (N.J. Cumberland County Ct. 1979).
205. See, e.g., MICH. CT. R. 4.201(H)(2) (2009); HENNEPIN COUNTY (MINN.) HOUS. CT. R.
608 (2000), available at http://www.mncourts.gov/ruledocs/general/GRtitleVII.htm#g608;
URLTA § 4.105(a); Bell v. Tsintolas Realty Co., 430 F.2d 474, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
206. See, e.g., MICH. CT. R. 4.201(H)(2)(a)(iii); Bell, 430 F.2d at 483.
207. URLTA § 4.105(a); see Lindsey v. Prillman, 921 A.2d 782 (D.C. 2007); Bell, 430
F.2d at 483.
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at issue.208 Some jurisdictions also restrict LPOs to delays clearly caused by
tenants.209
Although many jurisdictions require LPOs in all cases210 or allow them on
the judge’s own motion,211 others require the landlord to take the initiative by
filing a motion and showing “a clear need for protection” or something
similar.212 LPOs are equitable in nature,213 so landlords theoretically should
establish the usual prerequisites for obtaining equity, including irreparable
harm, inadequacy of their remedies at law, likely success on the merits,214 and
clean hands. Equity principles would require landlords to prove that they have
complied with health and safety laws to receive the “extraordinary”215
protection of an LPO, but there is little evidence that this happens in practice.
LPOs may require tenants to pay all current rent as it accrues,216 although
some may require less,217 such as the “reasonable rent for the premises.”218
They may also require tenants to deposit all of the back rent in dispute219 or the
undisputed portion of the back rent.220 LPOs generally require tenants to make
payments into a registry at the court,221 but others compel tenants to pay

208. MICH. CT. R. 4.201(J)(1); Cunningham v. Phoenix Mgmt., Inc., 540 A.2d 1099 (D.C.
1988).
209. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-26b (West 2006) allows LPOs when the tenant delays
filing her or his answer.
210. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.60(2) (West 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-7-75 (2010);
HENNEPIN COUNTY (MINN.) HOUS. CT. R. 608 (2000), available at http://www.mncourts.gov/
ruledocs/general/GRtitleVII.htm#g608; N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 302-a.3.c. (McKinney 2001);
King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 77 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973). But see Amanuensis, Ltd. v. Brown,
318 N.Y.S.2d 11, 20–21 (Civ. Ct. 1971).
211. URLTA § 4.105(a).
212. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-26b (West 2006); MICH. CT. R. 4.201(H)(2); McNeal
v. Habib, 346 A.2d 508, 512 (D.C. 1975) (giving tenant right to be heard but no right to present
evidence); Bell, 430 F.2d at 483–84; Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114 (W. Va. 1978).
213. Bell, 430 F.2d at 479.
214. Id. at 484.
215. Id. at 481–82.
216. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.60(2) (West 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 47-7-75 (a), (b)
(2010); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 521-78(a) (LexisNexis 2006); Lipshutz v. Shantha, 240 S.E.2d
738 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977) (refusing to reduce amount of LPOs by amount tenants spend on repairs).
217. See, e.g., URLTA § 4.105(a); Bell, 430 F.2d at 483.
218. MICH. CT. R. 4.201(H)(2)(a) (2009).
219. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.60(2) (West 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 47-7-75(a) (2010)
(mandatory deposit of all back rent “allegedly owed” for which the tenant cannot show a receipt);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-24-421(1) (2009) (allowing the court to require tenants to pay “all or part
of the rent accrued” into court); URLTA § 4.105(a); Fritz v. Warthen, 213 N.W.2d 339, 343
(Minn. 1973); see also Swartwood v. Rouleau, No. C8-98-1691, 1999 WL 293898 (Minn. Ct.
App. May 11, 1999) (requiring tender of all back rent allegedly due).
220. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1365(A) (West 2007).
221. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.60(2) (West 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 47-7-75
(2010); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 521-78 (LexisNexis 2006); MICH. CT. R. 4.201(H)(2)(1)(a)(i)
(2010); URLTA § 4.105(a); Bell, 430 F.2d at 479; Pugh v. Holmes, 405 A.2d 897, 907 (Pa. 1979);
King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 77 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
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landlords directly222 or require the court to disburse the tenant’s payments to
the landlord223 before a trial on the merits—or even after the tenant has
prevailed.224 LPO requirements may only come into effect if the action has not
been tried after a certain waiting period,225 and they may be limited to a
specific duration.226
The failure of many jurisdictions to specify the penalty or response for a
tenant’s failure to make payments required under an LPO, and a procedure for
imposing that penalty or response,227 suggests that many judges and legislators
are so far removed from the condition of low-income tenants that they cannot
imagine noncompliance.228 Although LPOs’ delay-preventing rationale would
make an accelerated trial on the merits a logical response to nonpayment of
escrow,229 a number of jurisdictions refuse to allow tenants to raise their defenses,230 deny tenants jury trials,231 or issue “default judgments” for landlords.232
222. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118A.490(1) (LexisNexis 2010); Dameron v.
Capitol House Assocs. Ltd., 431 A.2d 580 (D.C. 1981); City of Mt. Vernon v. Brooks, 469
N.Y.S.2d 517 (City Ct. 1983).
223. Cunningham v. Phoenix Mgmt., Inc. 540 A.2d 1099 (D.C. 1988); McNeal v. Habib,
346 A.2d 508, 512 (D.C. 1975); Juliano v. Strong, 448 A.2d 1379 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982); see, e.g.,
MICH. CT. R. 4.201(H)(2)(b) (requiring court to “consider the defendant’s defenses” but not
specifying whether this consideration must take the form of the trial); Fritz, 213 N.W.2d at 343;
King, 495 S.W.2d at 77; cf. Washington v. H.G. Smithy Co., 769 A.2d 134, 139 (D.C. 2001)
(allowing all collected rents to go to landlord if tenant did not raise habitability early in
proceedings). But see URLTA § 4.105(a) (allowing the court to “determine the amount due to
each party” but not specifying that this determination must be after a full trial on the merits);
Hinson v. Delis, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661, 666 (Ct. App. 1972); Bell, 430 F.2d at 485; Leejon Realty Co.
v. Davis, 416 N.Y.S.2d 948 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (denying disbursement to landlord who had failed to
make repairs).
224. Temple v. Thomas D. Walsh, Inc., 485 A.2d 192 (D.C. 1984).
225. See, e.g., MICH. CT. R. 4.201(H)(2)(a), 4.201(J)(1) (LPOs may be entered only for
delays of more than seven days); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 504B.341(a) (West 2002) (LPOs may be
entered for adjournments of more than six days); Liam Hooksett, LLC v. Boynton, 956 A.2d 304
(N.H. 2008) (allowing LPOs only when trial adjourned to allow for repairs); Edmond v. Waters,
374 A.2d 483 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977) (finding LPO inappropriate where trial imminent).
226. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 504B.341(b) (West 2002) (limiting adjournments and
LPOs to three months); cf. ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.190(a) (Michie 2010) (six-month limit on
tenants’ post-trial deposits where landlords have been found to have failed to maintain the
premises); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 540:13-d(II) (LexisNexis 2006) (one month limit on tenants’
post-trial deposits).
227. See, e.g., URLTA § 4.105(a); Bell, 430 F.2d 474; King, 495 S.W.2d 65.
228. But see Lovejoy v. Intervest Corp., 794 So. 2d 1205 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001) (upholding
“the principle that an excessive bond may not be used to deny a meritorious appeal to a person of
modest means”).
229. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-26b(d) (West 2006); see also Rome v. Walker,
196 N.W.2d 850, 854 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972).
230. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.60(2) (West 2004); Swartwood v. Rouleau, No. C898-1691, 1999 WL 293898 (Minn. Ct. App. May 11, 1999) (affirming refusal to allow tenant to
offer defenses without tendering all back rent allegedly due); Conway v. Nissley, No. 68536, 1995
WL 723298 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (affirming dismissal of counterclaims of tenant in arrearage on
rent); Smith v. Wright, 416 N.E.2d 655, 661 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979) (denying tenants the right to
raise the condition of the premises where they have not complied with an LPO); Jaroush v. Cook,
296 S.E.2d 544 (W. Va. 1982) (requiring consideration of defenses of tenant missing LPO
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c. LPOs’ Effect
Data on the issuance of, and compliance with, LPOs is largely lacking.233
As discussed in the next Section, however, very few low-income tenants appear
to receive relief based on the implied warranty of habitability and related
doctrines (such as constructive eviction and retaliatory eviction). Because they
sharply reduce the expected value of pursuing those defenses, LPOs likely are a
significant contributor to the low rate of relief granted to low-income tenants.
When Detroit’s Landlord-Tenant Court made the right to a trial by jury
conditional on compliance with LPOs, a year-long study found that not one of
the more than 20,000 tenants appearing unrepresented received a jury trial.234
Furthermore, both the burden of LPO payments and the risk of suffering
the penalties for noncompliance are considerably greater for the poorest tenants
and for those with the most serious repair problems. Conversely, LPOs provide
the greatest benefit to the least responsible landlords: those who fail to maintain
their units—and thus who would be most likely to lose in a trial on the merits—
and those willing to act ruthlessly to drive an assertive tenant from her or his
dwelling. LPOs therefore directly undermine the repair-forcing, redistributive,
and humanitarian goals of the tenants’ rights revolution.
The impact of LPOs varies dramatically depending on the wealth of the
tenant. For well-to-do tenants, complying with an LPO may be a bother and an
expense. For the lowest-income tenants, however, making escrow payments
may sometimes be impossible and may often require foregoing other
necessities.235 Where the tenant actually owes the demanded funds but faces a
payments).
231. See, e.g., MICH. CT. R. 4.201(H)(2)(a)(iii) (2009); Harris v. Hous. Auth. of Balt. City,
549 A.2d 770 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988) (requiring a hearing for tenant missing LPO payments).
This might also be the response of jurisdictions that impose LPOs in response to tenants’ jury
demands. See Bell, 430 F.2d at 483.
232. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 47-7-75(c) (2010); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 521-78(b)
(LexisNexis 2006); Davis v. Rental Assocs., Inc., 456 A.2d 820 (D.C. 1983) (approving default
judgment despite tenant’s tender of full amount of arrears prior to trial); Mahdi v. Poretsky
Mgmt., Inc., 433 A.2d 1085 (D.C. 1981) (approving judgment for landlord as sanction for tenant’s
nonpayment of LPO). But see K.D. Lewis Enters. Corp., Inc. v. Smith, 445 So. 2d 1032, 1035
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (granting landlord possession but allowing tenant to litigate
counterclaims); Rotheimer v. Arana, 892 N.E.2d 1183 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (rejecting judgments of
possession as sanctions for nonpayment of LPOs).
233. Cf. RICHARD T. LEGATES & ALAN GREENWOOD, AN ANALYSIS OF ADMINISTRATIVE
AND JUDICIAL COSTS OF PRE-TRIAL RENT DEPOSITS IN CALIFORNIA i (1992) (estimating large
administrative costs to expand LPOs).
234. Mosier & Soble, supra note 125, at 25, 36, 47. In 20,228 cases, the tenant had no
attorney. See id. at 26, 36.
235. Hous. Auth. of Balt., 549 A.2d 770 (rejecting hardship defense of unemployed tenant);
see CHILDREN’S SENTINEL NUTRITION ASSESSMENT PROGRAM (C-SNAP), FUEL FOR OUR
FUTURE: IMPACTS OF ENERGY INSECURITY ON CHILDREN’S HEALTH, NUTRITION, AND
LEARNING 3 (2007), available at http://www.childrenshealthwatch.org/upload/resource/
fuel_for_our_future_9_18_07.pdf (describing hardships low-income families face when they have
insufficient funds for both food and shelter costs).
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terrible dilemma, she or he may seek relief only under equity courts’ traditional
mandate of mercy for the poor.236 But if the landlord has failed to maintain the
premises, the implied warranty of habitability vitiates some or all of the
tenant’s rental obligation, and she or he should not be faulted for diverting
those funds to meet other needs. In addition, public assistance programs pay
some tenants’ rent directly to the landlord; these tenants may be unable to
redirect those payments to the court in time to prevent a default on the LPO.237
Unethical landlords may induce tenants to default on escrow payments.
Landlords are more likely to be repeat players with greater familiarity with
court procedures;238 they may be able to mislead or confuse their tenants about
the latter’s escrow obligations. In a jurisdiction providing for an automatic
forfeiture of the tenant’s rights upon a default in escrow payments, the landlord
may be able to induce a default with a hint of forbearance. Where the escrow
order was oral or written in “legalese,” a pro se tenant may default after relying
on inaccurate information from the landlord. The landlord may persuade the
court to issue an escrow order for more than the contract rent amount.239
Similarly, landlords in jurisdictions requiring payment of back rent in dispute
may demand money already received. Poor tenants particularly are susceptible
to these tactics, both because they cannot afford to make double payments and
because their market position prevents them from insisting upon more formal
accounting procedures.
The burden of LPOs may be compounded if the low-income tenant’s
dwelling has severe defects. The tenant may have to spend her or his rent
money to mitigate the damages a defect in the premises has caused.240 For
example, a tenant without adequate heat may spend the rent money on space
heaters. As such, malicious landlords can force tenants to divert their rent
money by cutting off essential utilities or creating some other intolerable
condition once an LPO issues.
Finally, tenants may have their own reasons for not complying with an
LPO. Tenants with strong defenses who would welcome decisions on the
merits may fail to make required escrow payments because they doubt the
courts will grant them redress. A tenant whose dwelling has deteriorated to the
236. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 88–89, 104 (2d ed.
1979).
237. Cf. Shipman v. Carr, 449 A.2d 187 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1982) (rejecting habitability
defense where Section 8 payments on behalf of tenant terminated due to landlord’s failure to
repair). A sophisticated tenant could explain this to the court; many low-income tenants, however,
may not know when or how to explain this or may be embarrassed by their public assistance
status.
238. Alan J. Pollock & George A. Kokus, Comment, Model Residential Landlord-Tenant
Code—Proposed Procedural Reforms, 25 U. MIAMI L. REV. 317, 321–22 (1971).
239. Lovejoy v. Intervest Corp., 794 So. 2d 1205 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001); Amanuensis, Ltd.
v. Brown, 318 N.Y.S.2d 11, 21 (Civ. Ct. 1971).
240. See Lipshutz v. Shantha, 240 S.E.2d 738 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977) (refusing to reduce
amount of LPO by amount tenants spent on repairs).
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point that it is worth far less than the payment the LPO requires may see
compliance as throwing good money after bad. Moving may seem a more
reasonable alternative, at least avoiding payment of back rent to the nonrepairing landlord. By encouraging tenants to move rather than to pursue claims
against non-repairing landlords, LPOs frustrate the instrumental, redistributive,
and humanitarian purposes of the tenants’ rights reforms (although they may
occasionally further contract principles by prompting efficient breaches).
B. Empirical Evidence of the New Regime’s Impact in Court
A wide variety of courts, using a wide variety of procedures, handle
eviction cases. Studies of the new landlord-tenant regime’s implementation
further vary in methodology and in quality. Their conclusions, however, are
strikingly consistent. Each step required to raise and favorably resolve claims
relating to disrepair has proven problematic.
First, the new substantive regime did not appear to increase the number of
eviction cases filed.241 This suggests that few tenants are withholding rent
deliberately to bring the issue of repairs to court.
Second, the judicial resources applied to the average case are quite
modest.242 Nine-minute trials243 take the concept of a “rocket docket” to an
entirely different level, and the number of jury trials has remained extremely
small.244
Third, a huge fraction of eviction cases never reach open court.245
Landlord-tenant courts have extremely high default rates.246 Courts depend on
241. Mosier & Soble, supra note 125, at 22, report that the number of possession actions
filed in Detroit’s Landlord-Tenant Court remained almost the same in 1969, the first full year in
which the reforms were in force. The number rose somewhat the next year, but then began moving
back towards its pre-tenants’-rights level.
242. In 1985, each New York City Housing Court judge handled 8,688 evictions. Ken
Karas, Recognizing a Right to Counsel for Indigent Tenants in Eviction Proceedings in New York,
24 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 527, 537 n.86 (1991). Detroit Landlord-Tenant Court judges
annually disposed of more than 10,000 cases each in the 1970s. Mosier & Soble, supra note 125,
at 21.
243. Rose & Scott, supra note 85, at 1001–03, found the average contested case is nine
minutes. Fusco et al., supra note 130, at 105 & n.60 (1979), reported that in Chicago “[t]he
average court-allotted time for each contested case was approximately two minutes,” including the
approximately twenty seconds “necessary to call the case and for the parties to approach the
bench.”
244. Mosier & Soble, supra note 125, at 49, report that only nine jury trials were held in
Detroit’s Landlord-Tenant Court in twelve months of 1970 and 1971. Over a fifteen-year period,
less than 0.05 percent of Ohio evictions were tried to a jury. See Frank G. Avellone, The
Maddening Status of the “Habitability Defense” in Ohio Eviction Law: Revisiting Where We
Must, 23 URB. LAW. 355, 359 n.31 (1991).
245. Some 96 percent of Maryland eviction cases are uncontested, making the appearance
of crowded dockets illusory. Williams v. Hous. Auth. of Balt., 760 A.2d 697 (Md. 2000).
246. Some 53 percent of the eviction actions filed in Springfield, Massachusetts in 1978
resulted in defaults being entered. Jerrold B. Winer, Pro Se Aspects of Hampden County Housing
Court: Helping People Help Themselves, 17 URB. L. ANN. 71, 79 (1979). Mosier & Soble, supra
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default judgments to control their dockets and design procedures to obtain them
whenever possible,247 typically requiring no motion or affidavit—which pro se
landlords might not know how to produce—before entering a default
judgment.248 In addition, court personnel and landlords’ lawyers induce most
tenants to concede in formal or informal settlements.249 Once the landlords
receive all that they sought—either rent or possession—they voluntarily
dismiss their cases.250 This suggests that many tenants are indeed choosing to
move rather than litigate. A number of judges encourage those tenants who do
reach court to make the same choice.251
Fourth, of the minority of cases that reach court, the overwhelming
majority are resolved with no reference to the condition of the premises.252
Some tenants may have their defenses foreclosed by failure to give the landlord
notice or to pay escrow under an LPO. For a great many, however, this is the
result of an overwhelming mismatch in knowledge and litigation capacity.
Many tenants lack the sophistication to assert the warranty in a written
pleading253 or the presence of mind and assertiveness to do so orally in the
momentary window of opportunity presented in open court.254 Because of very

note 125, at 26, reported that in 1970–1971, 59.2 percent of the nonpayment actions and 51.4
percent of other eviction actions resulted in default judgments against the tenant. Rose & Scott,
supra note 85, at 994, recorded a default rate of 49.4 percent in nonpayment actions and 45.2
percent in other eviction cases. About 80 percent of Washington, D.C., tenants default.
Cunningham, supra note 121, at 107, 134.
247. Rose & Scott, supra note 85, at 988 n.88.
248. Compare Cunningham, supra note 121, at 111, with FED. R. CIV. PROC. 55(b) (2010)
(requiring an affidavit or motion).
249. Cunningham, supra note 121, at 117; 144 Woodruff Corp. v. Lacrete, 585 N.Y.S.2d
956 (Civ. Ct. 1992) (describing tenants’ propensity to sign settlements out of fear even where they
have meritorious defenses).
250. Mosier & Soble, supra note 125, at 26, found 23.5 percent of nonpayment defendants,
and 17.0 percent of other eviction defendants, capitulated before their cases reached court. Rose &
Scott, supra note 85, at 994, similarly found 24.6 percent of nonpayment defendants and 11.2
percent of other tenant-defendants gave up before their court dates.
251. Judges repeatedly interrupted tenants’ testimony about defects in the premises with
coercive suggestions that the tenants move: “If it’s so bad, why don’t you move?,” “Of course you
want to move,” “Maybe he’s doing you a favor,” etc. Rose & Scott, supra note 85, at 1009–10;
Fusco et al., supra note 130, at 105 n.61; Garrett v. Cross, 935 So. 2d 845, 847 (La. Ct. App.
2006) (affirming trial judge who responded to tenant’s complaints about repairs by telling tenant
that was “one reason, probably, why you want to move out”).
252. See Berman & Sons, Inc. v. Jefferson, 396 N.E.2d 981, 985 (Mass. 1979) (noting that
tenants raise the new defenses in only a tiny fraction of cases, making the cost for landlords
slight).
253. E.g., Vanlandingham v. Ivanow, 615 N.E.2d 1361 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Sandefur
Mgmt. Co. v. Smith, 486 N.E.2d 1234 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985). A clerk reported, “it is almost
impossible to educate tenants that an answer should be filed prior to the hearing.” Winer, supra
note 246, at 78. Perhaps because of “an inability to express one’s feelings in writing, . . . the vast
majority of tenants simply appear in court to give their side of the story without any prior notice.”
Id.
254. Bezdek, supra note 87, at 566–97.
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limited legal services funding,255 tenants are seldom represented by counsel,256
and without the help of lawyers may not have a clear understanding of their
new rights or of court procedures.257 Landlords, on the other hand, are far more
likely to be represented258 and frequently leverage their superior legal
knowledge to confuse and mislead unrepresented tenants.259 Even when
landlords are not represented, courts typically require less specificity than the
usual level of notice pleading.260 Legal stationery stores, and even courts,
provide landlords with form complaints that prompt them for all allegations
required to make out their cases.261 No comparable resources are typically
available to pro se tenants unsure about their defenses.262 Judges and clerks
commonly assist landlords in making their cases and refuting their tenants’
cases.263 Thus landlords, in sharp contrast to tenants, actually fare better in
court unrepresented.264
255. Karas, supra note 242, at 535–36; Lynn E. Cunningham, The Legal Needs of the LowIncome Population of Washington, DC, 5 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 21, 58–61 (2000).
256. Brakel, supra note 83, at 581, reports that legal aid attorneys represent only 9 percent
of tenants in contested eviction cases. Mosier & Soble, supra note 125, at 36, report tenants being
represented in Detroit Landlord-Tenant Court in only 7 percent of contested cases. Fusco et al.,
supra note 130, at 105 n.63, report that only 7.1 percent of the tenants appearing in contested
cases were represented. With only one in five cases contested, Mosier & Soble, supra note 125, at
29, this means that only 1 to 2 percent of tenants facing eviction have counsel. Only 12 percent of
New York City tenants in contested cases had lawyers in the 1990s. Carroll Seron et al., The
Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor Tenants in New York City’s Housing Court:
Results of a Randomized Experiment, 35 L. & SOC’Y REV. 419, 421 (2001).
257. When Detroit’s Landlord-Tenant Court briefly replaced traditional legalese notices
and summonses with “plain English” forms briefly mentioning the defenses of retaliation and
failure to repair, tenants raised defenses at up to twice the prior rate. Rose & Scott, supra note 85,
at 997–99.
258. Mosier & Soble, supra note 125, at 36, report that landlords were represented in 48.6
percent of the “contested cases.” Fusco et al., supra note 130, at 105 n.62, found 73.8 percent of
Chicago landlords represented. Ninety-eight percent of New York City landlords had counsel.
Seron et al., supra note 256, at 421.
259. The Center for National Housing Law Reform’s 1978 study of landlord-tenant cases
in eleven Michigan cities found that in 90 percent of the cases resolved out-of-court, tenants
received terms as bad as or worse than the harshest judgments the court could have issued (on file
with author).
260. Cunningham, supra note 121, at 127–29.
261. Id. at 119.
262. A court committee in Detroit designed, but did not widely distribute, a form answer.
Rose & Scott, supra note 85, at 986–91, 1024. The Connecticut Housing Court made similar
efforts to be open to pro se litigants. Eldergill, supra note 118, at 299–300.
263. Fusco et al., supra note 130, at 108–25; see Espinoza v. Calva, 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 492,
496 (Ct. App. 2008) (reversing trial court for so limiting tenants’ time to present evidence as to “in
effect, preclude[] them from presenting their defense”); R & O Mgmt. Corp. v. Ahmad, 819
N.Y.S.2d 382 (App. Term. 2006) (reversing dismissal of tenant’s counterclaims, which the
landlord-tenant court had entered because the landlord was unprepared); Koch v. Mac Queen, 746
N.Y.S.2d 229 (App. Term. 2002) (reversing trial judge that rejected habitability defense after
refusing to subpoena building inspector and refusing to admit photographs of the premises);
Prince Hall Village Apts. v. Braddy, 538 P.2d 603 (Okla. Civ. App. 1975) (finding bias in trial
judge’s questioning of tenant about receipt of welfare).
264. Mosier & Soble, supra note 125, at 35–37 (citing results from Detroit and Brooklyn);
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The adjudicatory model that emerges is a curious hybrid of the common
law adversarial system and an almost administrative inquisitorial system.
Landlords—these courts’ traditional constituents—benefit from a particularly
lenient version of notice pleading, approaching an inquisitorial approach.
Tenants, on the other hand, must articulate an explicit legal defense in a way
more reminiscent of antiquated common law pleading265—or even the old
English practice of “waging one’s law.”266
Fifth, studies indicate that landlords have won an overwhelming
proportion of the nonpayment actions filed. Even where rental housing
conditions were bad267 and getting worse,268 landlords were winning total
victories in upwards of 97 percent of all nonpayment cases started.269 And with
Rose & Scott, supra note 85, at 1001–02.
265. See Brown v. Robyn Realty Co., 367 A.2d 183 (Del. Super. Ct. 1976) (dismissing
tenant’s habitability argument for failure to plead terms of lease properly); Garrett v. Cross, 935
So. 2d 845 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (finding tenant’s complaint about landlord’s failure to repair
insufficient to assert habitability defense); Jablonski v. Casey, 835 N.E.2d 615 (Mass. App. Ct.
2005) (affirming dismissal of habitability defense despite housing code violations, including leaks,
cracked walls and floors, and ant infestation, for tenant’s failure to show clear harm); Flynn v.
Riemer, 1991 Mass. App. Div. 50 (Dist. Ct. 1991) (finding no breach of warranty when tenant was
without water for four weeks but did not prove that landlord acted willfully); Payne v. Rivera, 904
N.Y.S.2d 878 (Civ. Ct. 2010) (severing tenant’s counterclaim for failure to repair); 601 West
Realty LLC. v. Chapa, No. 59446/03, 2003 WL 22087614 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. July 28, 2003)
(dismissing tenant’s counterclaim because tenant “failed to establish the impact of” lead paint and
other housing code violations); Cater v. Saunders, No. SP 5881/01, 2002 WL 31207219 (N.Y.
Dist. Ct. Sept. 30, 2002) (same); L & M Inv. Co. v. Morrison, 605 P.2d 1347 (Or. Ct. App. 1980)
(finding housing code violations insufficient to establish lack of habitability); cf. Dickhut v.
Norton, 173 N.W.2d 297 (Wis. 1970) (imposing strict requirements on tenants alleging retaliatory
eviction).
266. Compurgation, or wager of law, required certain litigants to recite long, complicated
oaths asserting the merit of their position. Any slips of the tongue and the matter would be decided
against them. BAKER, supra note 236, at 5–6.
267. At the same time Cleveland’s landlord-tenant court was rarely invoking the warranty,
64,000 of the 133,000 rental units in Cleveland were “substandard.” David M. McIntyre, URLTA
in Operation: The Ohio Experience, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 587, 595. The estimated rat
population of the City of Detroit in 1974 was 750,000. DETROIT NEWS, July 1, 1974, at 2B.
268. The Detroit Department of Health reported in 1972 that there were 5,185 fewer wellmaintained residential structures in the city that year than there were in 1968, the year Michigan’s
legislature passed the tenants’ rights reforms. Mosier & Soble, supra note 125, at 64, n.92.
Approximately 30 percent of Detroit’s housing was “deteriorating” or “dilapidated” in 1972. Id.
269. Gerchick, supra note 139, at 790. Mosier & Soble report that Detroit tenants in 1970–
1971 won total victories in only 0.1 percent of the nonpayment of rent cases started. Mosier &
Soble, supra note 125, at 33. Tenants won partial rent abatements in another 2 percent of the
cases. Id. Rose & Scott, supra note 85, at 1009 fig.17, report that landlords were winning
favorable outcomes in 97.5 percent of the nonpayment cases started in 1974. Fusco et al., supra
note 130, at 104, report that Chicago landlords in 1976 won everything they sought in at least 84.6
percent of the “contested cases” heard. This figure is virtually identical to the “contested case”
statistics that Mosier & Soble report. Mosier & Soble, supra note 125, at 33. (A “contested case”
is one in which both the landlord and the tenant appear. Mosier & Soble reported that only 20.1
percent of the Detroit cases were “contested.” Id. at 26. If the Chicago court had a similar rate of
defaults and voluntary dismissals by landlords before cases came to court, it too would have an
approximately 97 percent victory rate for landlords.) And some of the winners were more
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the lack of counsel and lack of sophistication among pro se tenants contributing
significantly to these results—and with the poorest tenants typically living in
the worst housing—the largest disparity between objective housing conditions
and results in court is likely among those whom the reforms most sought to aid.
Sixth, even in those rare cases where courts did award tenants relief for
defective housing, the amounts of those awards were far too small to
incentivize landlords to make repairs or to encourage other tenants to raise
defenses.270
Seventh, although objective data is unavailable on the number of tenants
with valid retaliation defenses, judgment for a tenant on this basis is extremely
rare.271 A landlord contemplating a retaliatory eviction is unlikely to be
deterred by a prohibition so seldom enforced.272 Although no empirical
evidence allows comparison of the number of landlords resorting to self-help
before and after the reforms, their success rate in court gives them little reason
to resort to self-help.
Beyond these outcome measures is a consistent picture of courts illequipped or disinclined to carry out the transformative role the tenants’ rights
revolution envisioned for them.273 Michigan’s Supreme Court lamented:
sophisticated middle-class tenants, hardly those whose conditions prompted the reforms. See
McIntyre, supra note 267, at 596.
270. See, e.g., C.F. Seabrook Co. v. Beck, 417 A.2d 89 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980)
(denying rent abatements for months other than those for which landlord’s action sought rent);
303 Beverly Grp., L.L.C. v. Alster, 735 N.Y.S.2d 908 (App. Term 2001) (disallowing
consequential damages); Landmarks Restoration Corp. v. Gwardyak, 485 N.Y.S.2d 917 (City Ct.
1985) (abating rent 20 percent but offsetting that with an exceptional award of attorneys’ fees to
the landlord); Tower West Assocs. v. Derevnuk, 450 N.Y.S.2d 947 (Civ. Ct. 1982) (granting 10
percent rent abatement); Surratt v. Newton, 393 S.E.2d 554 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (disallowing
damages exceeding the amount of rent paid). But see Brown v. LeClair, 482 N.E.2d 870 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1985) (affirming award of statutory damages for willful failure to repair); Pleasant East
Assocs. v. Cabrera, 480 N.Y.S.2d 693 (Civ. Ct. 1984) (awarding punitive damages where failure
to repair is racially motivated).
271. According to Mosier & Soble, supra note 125, at 34–35, Detroit tenants in 1970–1971
won only 0.4 percent of all simple termination cases started. Some of these cases may have
involved other defenses, such as an assertion that the notice to terminate tenancy was improper in
form or service. So the actual number of cases in which tenants prevailed on the retaliation
defense could be even smaller. (The Chicago figures reported, supra note 269, were for all
“contested cases,” including both nonpayment and other termination actions.)
272. Moreover, because the only penalty for attempted retaliation is refusal to allow that
eviction, even strict enforcement of the prohibition would have little deterrent value. See Bldg.
Monitoring Sys., Inc. v. Paxton, 905 P.2d 1215 (Utah 1995) (allowing retaliatory evictions once
premises repaired and tenant given time to find other housing).
273. Fusco et al., supra note 130, at 108–25. Judges ruled against tenants even when the
tenants were the only competent testimony on an issue, id. at 112, even when they supported a
defense of payment with receipts, id. at 113, and even when they proved the existence of serious
repair problems with unrebutted photographic evidence, id. at 111 n.91. Judges relied upon the
incompetent hearsay of landlords’ lawyers who admitted having had no direct contact with the
premises. Id. at 125. Judges asked landlords’ lawyers to check tenants’ allegations with their
clients by telephone and then entered judgment against the tenants on the basis of the landlords’
un-cross-examined “telephone testimony.” Id. “[D]ead attorneys and landlords have secured
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The atmosphere of the Detroit Landlord-Tenant Court . . . does not
encourage deliberate, reasoned and compassionate justice, although it
deals with one of the basic material essentials of life, a roof over one’s
head. Judges, litigants and court personnel are harassed and depressed.
In many cases both the landlords and tenants are barely making it
financially, and oftentimes they are not making it at all. Cases involve
housing conditions that are not the most desirable. Consequently,
relations are often strained and not infrequently beyond the breaking
point. Many of the tenants do not understand their rights at all,
although some understand them too well. Sometimes landlords are in
the same posture. It would be difficult to handle these cases with
justice under the best of circumstances. But circumstances are far
from the best. The case load is incredible. The court facilities are just
a little better than tolerable. Matters that can be avoided are
avoided.274
As noted above, tenants’ propensity to raise the landlord’s failure to
repair, and hence the implied warranty’s deterrent effect, depends heavily on
tenants’ prospects of success in court, both initially and against any subsequent
retaliation. This particularly is true for tenants contemplating deliberate rent
withholding. With substantive rules barring involuntary defendants and courts’
tepid implementation deterring more financially stable tenants, the implied
warranty’s effect is limited to a small group of outliers. The next Part asks
whether means were available to do better.
III.
WERE THE NEW REGIME’S FAILURES INEVITABLE?
The result of the supposed tenants’ rights revolution falls far short of
achieving any of its three instrumental goals of improving the condition of
rental housing, redistribution of income, and averting humanitarian crises.275
Different substantive and procedural rules might have made the tenants’ rights
revolution more effective. On the other hand, changes that have taken place in
the housing market over the past several decades might have limited the impact
of even a more sensitively designed regime of landlord-tenant law. In the same
way, the demise of high-paying, low-skill, industrial jobs and changing

favorable judgment when represented by persons unauthorized to practice law.” Id. at 118. Rose &
Scott, supra note 85, at 1009–12, describe similar practices in Detroit’s Landlord-Tenant Court.
274. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Wingate, 273 N.W.2d 456, 460–61 (Mich. 1979).
275. Moreover, as discussed above, supra notes 267–72 and accompanying text, even the
new regime’s intramural goal of legal modernization faltered. The covenants of landlord and
tenant are not truly mutual if the tenant’s breach renders the landlord’s irrelevant, but the converse
is not true. As such, the reform failed to modernize this area of law. Landlord-tenant law remains
an idiosyncratic world unto itself if landlords can obtain an effectively equitable remedy without
showing prerequisites for equitable relief, including clean hands and the lack of an adequate
remedy at law—and without themselves being subject to equitable orders compelling their
compliance with the covenant of repair during an action’s pendency.
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attitudes toward social provision following the collapse of communism would
have limited the success of even a more robust regime of welfare rights.
The state of rental housing may have changed during this period,276 but
the implied warranty appears to have affected far too few cases to be a likely
cause.277 For the same reason, it seems unlikely that the implied warranty has
done much to improve the quality of life of the low-income tenants whose
plight it claimed to address.
Although the substantive and procedural obstacles to the implied
warranty’s implementation are superficially separate, they are linked. The
doctrines that limit who can raise the implied warranty impose a form of
rationing of judicial resources, which seemed necessary to the courts because
those resources did not increase with the new need to find facts concerning
housing conditions. The number of tenants deliberately invoking the warranty
is small enough that the courts could adjudicate their cases more or less within
existing resource constraints.
This Part analyzes the tenants’ rights revolution’s failure on several levels.
Section A shows that the explicit legal rules that have prevented widespread
invocation of the implied warranty were not inevitable corollaries of the new
tenants’ rights. Section B considers whether the tenants’ rights revolution might
have benefited from an infusion of procedural ideas from the contemporary
welfare rights revolution. Section C explores broader changes in the housing
market to which the tenants’ rights revolution has failed to respond. Finally,
Section D sums up the new regime’s impact, highlighting the similarity
between its failings and those of the welfare rights revolution identified in the
Introduction.
A. Substantive Failures: Unjustified Limitations on the Implied Warranty
Identifying the sources and underlying rationales of the policies that have
curtailed the implied warranty of habitability is difficult for two reasons. Some
reasons for the warranty’s failure, such as the complexity of trial courts’
operating procedures and attitudes of trial judges and clerks, are difficult to
document and genuinely may not result from any organized, conscious decision
making. Others, including notice requirements and LPOs, are obvious and
deliberate but have impacts that are hard to trace in the empirical literature. All
of these barriers operate as a system, even if they were not designed as such.
Subsection 1 critiques the requirement that tenants withhold rent deliberately if
276. See infra Part III.C.
277. The overwhelming empirical evidence of the warranty’s non-enforcement in court
would seem to require econometricians claiming to find evidence of its effects to explain a
mechanism by which that result might be achieved. E.g., Werner Z. Hirsch, From “Food For
Thought” to “Empirical Evidence” About Consequences of Landlord-Tenant Laws, 69 CORNELL
L. REV. 604, 609 (1984); Werner Z. Hirsch, Habitability Laws and the Welfare of Indigent
Tenants, 63 REV. ECON. & STAT. 263 (1981).
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they wish to raise the implied warranty of habitability. Subsection 2 questions
the wisdom and legality of LPOs. In both instances, ambivalence about the
implications of the tenants’ rights revolution, or about low-income tenants,
proved far more important than broader legal and policy principles. Had they
tried, courts and advocates would have found compelling reasons to reject the
requirements of deliberate withholding and of LPOs.
1. The Requirement of Deliberate Rent Withholding
The doctrines confining the implied warranty’s availability to tenants
deliberately provoking nonpayment actions, and excluding those raising the
warranty only defensively, in part represent a moral judgment. The precise
basis of that judgment is unclear: surely a struggling business that fell behind
on its payments to a vendor could argue that the vendor’s goods were defective
without opprobrium. Middle-class judges and lawyers, however, pay for their
purchases on time as a matter of pride, and by failing to do so without a
deliberate, legally sanctioned plan, low-income tenants place themselves
outside of the middle-class value system. Courts and even tenants’ own lawyers
describe the requirement that tenants have the funds to pay the contract rent as
demonstrating “good faith.” Yet lacking funds is not an indication of
dishonesty,278 but rather means the tenant may be incapable of present
performance. That should not necessarily excuse the landlord’s performance.
“It is customary to pay rent in advance”279 for each month. The landlord
must perform her or his covenants during the upcoming month to earn the
prepaid rent. If the premises fall into disrepair during the ensuing month, the
landlord has not earned the rent already paid and is in breach.280 The standard
rule in contract is that a non-breaching party need not continue to perform once
the other has committed a material breach281—in the present context, a breach
that gives the tenant “substantially less or different” from what the warranty of
habitability requires.282 Not all breaches of the covenant to repair are material,
but many are. Thus, if the landlord’s implied covenant to repair is truly mutual
with the tenant’s express covenant to pay rent, the tenant’s obligation to pay
278. “Poverty and immorality are not synonymous.” Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160,
177 (1941).
279. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 65 (1972).
280. When rent is prepaid and the tenant stops paying rent after the premises have fallen
into disrepair, the landlord will have failed to render performance for which the tenant has already
paid. The tenant’s tender of the next month’s rent is therefore not a condition to the landlord’s
performance of her or his covenants for that month since the landlord has yet to earn all of the rent
that she or he has already received.
281. For example, “[I]t is a condition of each party’s remaining duties to render
performance to be exchanged under an exchange of promises that there be no uncured material
failure by the other party to render any such performance due at an earlier time.” RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237 (1981).
282. 23 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 63:3 (4th ed. 2002) [hereinafter
WILLISTON].
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rent ceases when material defects appear in the premises.283 Once the landlord
materially breaches the implied warranty of habitability, the tenant’s ability or
inclination to pay rent becomes irrelevant because that “performance is
excused”284 until the landlord comes into compliance, at which point damages
for the landlord’s breach are ascertained.
Alternatively, if the landlord’s failure to repair is not material and the
tenant has stopped paying rent, contract law would treat both parties as being in
breach and award appropriate damages against each.285 Where the tenant’s duty
to pay rent depends on the landlord’s performing the covenant to repair and the
landlord fails to do so, the landlord is entitled to damages, not the contract
rent.286 Under this view, both landlord and tenant must answer for their
respective breaches where the tenant has stopped paying rent on a defective
dwelling. Requiring the tenant to perform, or demonstrate capacity to perform,
her or his covenant in order for the landlord to be liable for her or his breaches
is inconsistent with true mutuality of obligations.
Similarly, whether the tenant knows her or his legal rights at the time she
or he stops paying rent would be irrelevant under general contract law. Breach
is defined by the nonperforming party’s conduct,287 not the contemporaneous
state of mind of the party alleging the breach.288 The general rule in contract is
that “notice or demand is unnecessary where the obligation to perform is
absolute and unconditional.”289 Exceptions apply when the obligated party has
no way to know when its performance is necessary or when the contract
explicitly requires notice.290 Although some defects may be within the sole
knowledge of the tenant, many are not. Some are present when the tenant takes
possession.291 Landlords can observe most others when they inspect their
properties to ensure that tenants are not causing damage. The Uniform
Commercial Code’s (UCC) rule requiring notice of breach of warranty for
defective goods292 provides a dubious analogy because there the vendor has no
continuing access to the goods; in any event, most courts hold it inapplicable
where the vendor is aware of the breach, as landlords often will be.293

283. Conversely, of course, once the tenant stopped paying rent, a landlord who was then
in compliance with the covenant to repair may regard the tenant as being in breach.
284. 23 WILLISTON, supra note 282, § 63:3.
285. ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 946 (one vol. ed. 1952); 23
WILLISTON, supra note 282, § 63:3.
286. 23 WILLISTON, supra note 282, § 63:2.
287. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 235(2) (1981).
288. 23 WILLISTON, supra note 282, § 63:1.
289. 17A AM. JUR. 2d CONTRACTS § 594 (2004).
290. Id.
291. Limiting the implied warranty to latent defects, see Rabin, supra note 23, at 580, thus
would strengthen notice requirements and make the warranty still harder to enforce.
292. U.C.C. § 2-607 (2009).
293. 18 WILLISTON, supra note 282, § 52:42 (4th ed. 2001).
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Of course, because the warranty of habitability is a term read into the
landlord-tenant contract by courts, the courts could insert a notice requirement
as well.294 Doing so, however, would be unwise, particularly in light of the
lower courts’ difficulty in enforcing the new landlord-tenant regime. Giving
notice exposes the tenant to the risks of retaliation. Tenants currently unaware
of the warranty of habitability and of the legal protection against retaliatory
eviction are exceedingly unlikely to risk giving notice to a landlord they
suspect does not wish to repair the premises further. For the tenant that is familiar with her or his rights, the decision whether to give notice is similar to, but
not identical with, that discussed in the preceding Part about whether to invoke
the warranty of habitability affirmatively: the tenant has no immediate prospect
of monetary reward for taking action, but she or he also does not face any
immediate litigation costs and may hope that merely notifying the landlord of a
defect may not be as likely to provoke retaliation as withholding rent or filing
suit. As discussed above, however, making the implied warranty available only
to tenants making a deliberate decision to punish the landlord’s failure to repair
is likely to limit the effectiveness of that warranty considerably.
2. Landlords’ Protective Orders
The justifications offered for LPOs correspond closely to those for
insisting that rent withholding be deliberate. Even more directly than the
requirements of deliberate withholding, LPOs have become a means of docket
control, helping to bridge the gap between the new regime’s generous
substantive pronouncements and its parsimonious allocation of adjudicatory
resources. LPOs are likely to cause some cases to settle and others to drop from
dockets when tenants miss escrow payments due to financial emergencies or
fatigue from living in the poorly repaired dwelling. This docket-control
orientation likely explains why rules limiting LPOs to unusual circumstances
quickly gave way to near-universal issuance.
Because they so explicitly limit the mutuality of the covenants of landlord
and tenant and so directly subordinate the instrumental goals of the new
substantive regime, LPOs provide a useful basis for assessing whether the
apparent revolution in landlord-tenant law represents a fundamental change or a
modest, nearly cosmetic, update. Subsection 2.a considers and dismisses the
major rationales offered for LPOs. Subsection 2.b suggests that contemporary
constitutional law provided courts several bases on which they could have
declined to impose, or struck down, LPO requirements.
a. Deficiencies in the Justifications Offered for LPOs
The weak justifications for LPOs suggest that LPOs are not necessary to
the implementation of the warranty of habitability. Arguments that LPOs are
294.

Most legislative implied warranties of habitability have no such term.
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required to avoid depriving landlords of property without due process of the
law cannot bear serious scrutiny. First, the supposed deprivation of property
suffered by a landlord during the course of the litigation of a possession dispute
is no different from that suffered by any plaintiff with a meritorious claim.
Second, whether the accruing rent is in fact the landlord’s property is unclear
until trial of the tenant’s defenses. Third, even assuming the validity of the
landlord’s claim, routine litigation delays probably do not constitute a
deprivation of due process.295 The U.S. Supreme Court seems unlikely to apply
Mathews v. Eldridge296 or similar due process tests to constitutionalize the
scheduling of civil litigation, least of all in “summary proceedings” already
expedited more than most civil cases.297 Indeed, landlords have no more right
to compensation for the new defenses’ elongation of possessory actions than
tenants had when summary proceedings replaced slow-moving common law
ejectment.
LPOs, therefore, represent policy choices rather than constitutional
obligations. The policy arguments for LPOs298 reflect the normative confusion
underlying the tenants’ rights revolution. For example, several of the arguments
for LPOs reveal deep diffidence about equalizing the position of landlord and
tenant. Arguments that LPOs protect landlords from harm while the litigation is
pending apply equally well to tenants living in defective housing, yet only the
tenant’s covenant, and not the landlord’s, receives extraordinary pretrial
enforcement. Similarly, while LPOs protect landlords from the possibility of
unenforceable judgments,299 no comparable measure assures tenants that
landlords will make repairs the court finds necessary or pay any judgments on
the tenants’ counterclaims.
LPOs also preserve the exceptionalism of landlord-tenant law that the new
regime sought to end: few other civil litigants must pay the moneys sought by
their adversaries to assert their defenses—even when the amount in controversy
is far higher than the value of most dwellings in summary proceedings cases.300

295. Any rule allowing tenants to stay in their dwellings during the pendency of the
litigation is “in no way responsible for” the tenants’ actions as it only “permits but does not
compel” those private actions. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 165 (1978).
296. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
297. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 536 (1972) (finding even the constitutional right
to a speedy trial in a criminal case not violated where the record indicates “that the defendant did
not want a speedy trial”).
298. See supra Part II.A.2.a.
299. Many states’ summary proceedings do not award money judgments against tenants
but state rental arrears “only for the purpose of prescribing the amount which . . . shall be paid to
preclude issuance of the writ of restitution.” MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5741 (West 2000);
Bell v. Tsintolas Realty Co., 430 F.2d 474, 485 n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Schlesinger v. Brown, 282
A.2d 790, 791 (N.J. Essex County Ct. 1971). Landlords in these states have no judgments to
enforce.
300. Bell, 430 F.2d at 479 (noting that “such a protective order represents a noticeable
break with the ordinary processes of civil litigation”).
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And as one court found, there is “no evidence which indicates that it is any
more difficult to satisfy a judgment against a tenant than against any other
debtor.”301
Imposing LPOs to prevent delay in landlord-tenant proceedings similarly
lacks justification. As the Supreme Court has noted,
Some delay . . . is inherent in any fair-minded system of justice. A
landlord-tenant dispute, like any other lawsuit, cannot be
resolved with due process of law, unless both parties have had a fair
opportunity to present their cases. Our courts were never intended to
serve as rubber stamps for landlords seeking to evict their tenants, but
rather to see that justice be done before a man is evicted from his
home.302
Eviction cases, unlike more complex civil cases, provide little opportunity to
stall with abusive discovery. To treat the warranty defense as a culpable delay
betrays an ambivalence about the new regime that courts and legislatures can
address substantively if they are so inclined. The main cause of delay in many
courts is a deficient allocation of resources to adjudicate eviction cases,303
reflecting a sense that they are less important than the rest of the courts’
dockets.304 Prompt scheduling, not LPOs, is the obvious remedy.305
LPOs likewise fail to serve the instrumental goal of improving urban
housing conditions. The achievement of this goal requires courts to accept large
numbers of cases, at least initially. Yet some courts openly acknowledge using
LPOs for docket control.306 LPOs also eliminate the incentives for tenants in
ill-repaired dwellings to undertake the risk, expense, and effort required to
assert the implied warranty by requiring them to create a “pool,” which the
landlord has not earned, to finance repairs. This pool also reduces landlords’
incentives to maintain their units prior to litigation.
As with the roughly contemporaneous imposition of costly work
requirements that did little to enhance welfare recipients’ employability,307 the
motivation for LPOs appears largely moralistic. Granting welfare rights only to
those recipients proving their moral worth through participation in workfare
obviated the need to confront stereotypes of the lazy poor;308 confining tenants’
rights to those tenants proving their sincerity with deposits in court similarly

301. Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284, 295 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
302. Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 385 (1974).
303. See David A. Super, Against Flexibility, 96 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2011)
(discussing shortages of adjudicatory resources).
304. Eldergill, supra note 118, at 297.
305. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5735(2), (4) (West 2000) (establishing
strict scheduling timelines); BOSTON HOUS. CT. R. 5 (2009).
306. See, e.g., MICH. CT. R. 4.201(H)(2)(a)(iii) allows the court to preserve a non-paying
tenant’s right to a jury trial “if, in the court’s discretion, the court’s schedule permits it.”
307. KATZ, supra note 59, at 64–66.
308. Super, New Moralizers, supra note 50, at 2045–46.
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insulated judges and legislators from attacks based on the stereotypes of the
irresponsible, manipulative poor. In each case, however, the failure to
understand the challenges low-income families confront led to numerous false
negatives—industrious welfare recipients unable to navigate workfare
bureaucracies and honest tenants unable to comply with LPOs—and prevented
the underlying substantive reforms from reaching more than a tiny fraction of
their target populations. As the Court noted in Lindsey v. Normet, monetary
barriers to access to the court system not only bar meritorious arguments by
those unable to make payments, but also allow frivolous claims “by others who
can afford” the required amounts.309 Little evidence suggests that tenants are
more prone to raise meritless defenses than landlords are to make abusive
claims310 or, indeed, than litigants in other kinds of cases are to abuse the
process.
b. Constitutional Questions About LPOs
In keeping with the sharp line the Court insisted it was drawing between
substance and process,311 Lindsey v. Normet declined to constitutionalize the
implied warranty of habitability.312 LPOs, however, are procedural. At the same
time the implied warranty of habitability was sweeping the country, several
newly evolving due process doctrines seemed to cast grave doubt on the
constitutionality of LPOs. Curiously, however, few reported decisions consider
such challenges. This may reflect the paucity of low-income tenants’ litigation
resources, as well as the difficulty low-income tenants face staying in disputed
units long enough for their cases to reach appellate courts. At a minimum, these
doctrines suggest that LPOs were far from inevitable. The prevalence of LPOs
therefore seems attributable to courts’ deeper ambivalence about the tenants’
rights revolution.
At least three evolving doctrines might have rendered LPOs
unconstitutional. First, just as courts were adopting LPOs, the Court was
striking down other similar payment requirements: filing fees for divorces,313
double appeal bonds for tenants appealing eviction decisions,314 prohibitions on
remarriages for absent parents behind on their child support payments,315 and
paternity actions in which putative fathers were denied blood tests for which
they could not pay.316 When the Court upheld filing fees for bankruptcy317 and
309. 405 U.S. 76, 78 (1972).
310. Amanuensis, Ltd. v. Brown, 318 N.Y.S.2d 11, 21 (Civ. Ct. 1971).
311. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 563, 564 (1972) (differentiating between an
employee’s substantive and procedural due process rights).
312. 405 U.S. at 64.
313. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971).
314. Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 74.
315. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 382 (1978).
316. Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 17 (1981); see also Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409, 409
(1887) (rejecting monetary barriers to court access).
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for appeals of welfare fair hearing decisions,318 it distinguished the prior cases
as involving a state monopoly on the means to resolve those petitioners’ claims.
The same logic would seem to distinguish LPOs, because defendants by
definition face a judicial monopoly on resolution of the claims brought against
them.319 The Court also seemed to think that some of the access fees it upheld
were de minimus burdens that would not deter determined litigants;320 monthly
rental payments are not de minimus.321
A second line of cases during this period invalidated coerced prejudgment
deprivations of property,322 a category that might be expected to include LPOs.
In these cases, the Court required a prior judicial determination of probable
cause to support the seizure of an opposing claimant’s property323 and, even
then, permitted deprivations only for the briefest of periods necessary to
arrange and hold a hearing to adjudicate the claims to possession of the
disputed property.324 The Court also required the party seeking a seizure to post
a bond against wrongful deprivations of property.325 Coerced deprivations, such
as LPOs, are treated identically with physical seizures.326 Whether or not the
rent is turned over to the landlord, the property is “impounded and, absent a
bond, put totally beyond [the defendant’s] use during the pendency of the
litigation” and hence seized.327 Beyond this, the court must balance the parties’
interests in determining whether any prejudgment seizure is justified.328 At a

317. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 443–44, 450 (1973).
318. Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 656, 658–61 (1973) (per curiam); see also Bankers
Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 85 (1988) (upholding 15 percent penalty on
unsuccessful appeals of money judgments).
319. In Little, Lindsey, and Hovey, litigants successfully challenging access barriers had
been brought into court involuntarily as defendants. Little, 452 U.S. at 3; Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 59–
62; Hovey, 167 U.S. at 409–10. Kras and Ortwein rejected challenges from parties seeking to
initiate judicial proceedings. Kras, 409 U.S. at 437; Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 656–57. To be sure,
fortuitous circumstances can determine whether a litigant is a plaintiff or a defendant. Frank I.
Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One’s Rights—
Part I, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1154–58. Once someone is haled into court as a defendant, however,
she or he must depend on the court to vindicate her or his rights in the litigation.
320. See Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 660 (describing the fee as providing “some small revenue”);
Kras, 409 U.S. at 449.
321. They most resemble the child support payments in Zablocki, where the appellee was
ordered to pay $109 per month. 434 U.S. at 378.
322. N. Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. 601, 605–08 (1975); Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67, 96–97 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969). This was
one of the grounds on which Amanuensis, Ltd. v. Brown, 318 N.Y.S.2d 11, 15, 21 (Civ. Ct. 1971),
struck down New York’s LPO statute.
323. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. at 606–07. Indeed, Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 24 (1991),
decided two decades after LPOs came into broad use, holds that prejudgment seizures may be
unconstitutional even after a showing of probable cause.
324. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 15.
325. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 606–07 (1974).
326. See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 20 n.26 (1978).
327. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. at 606.
328. Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 606–10. Crucial in Mitchell were that the proceedings there had
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minimum, these cases would seem to compel courts to hold a trial of the
possession dispute within about ten days.329 They also would invalidate
automatic requirements for escrow payments without specific judicial
findings.330 And yet these arguments rarely appear in LPO cases.
A third doctrine the Court explored in this period involved the
longstanding principle that “[t]he fundamental requisite of due process of law is
the opportunity to be heard,”331 allowing the defendant to “choose for himself
whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest.”332 By 1976, the Court had
crystallized much of its due process analysis into the Mathews v. Eldridge333
balancing test—a test that LPOs would be unlikely to pass. Mathews requires
the court to weigh three factors: (1) “the private interest that will be affected”;
(2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.”334 Taking these factors in turn,
first, tenants’ property interests, as the Court has acknowledged,335 are
substantial; the common law also recognized a tenant’s leasehold as property
long before the advent of the “new property.”336 Second, the risk of erroneous
deprivation when a trial is denied to a tenant failing to make required payments
is roughly equal to the fraction of tenants with good defenses.337 The probable
value of doing away with the sanctions for LPOs is the sum of the individual
values of each of the “procedural safeguards” that would then become available
at a trial. The procedural detriment also is high where failure to make required
payments results in loss of the right to a jury.338 Finally, as for the
a “low risk of a wrongful determination of possession,” id. at 610, the issues were amenable to
simple documentary proof, id. at 609–10, and the stakes were relatively modest for those subject
to seizure, id. at 610. None of these factors militates in favor of LPOs.
329. Id. at 607.
330. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. at 606. Nor may the court issue an LPO upon only conclusory
allegations in a complaint or application, or upon more specific information based upon hearsay.
Id. at 607.
331. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
332. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
333. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
334. Id. at 335. Although Mathews was an administrative law case, the Court applied its
criteria to private civil litigation. Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 6 (1981). But see Dusenbery v.
United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167–68 (2002) (narrowing Mathew’s applicability long after LPOs
had become well established).
335. Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 385 (1974); Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S.
444, 452 (1982); see also Thorpe v. Hous. Auth., 386 U.S. 670 (1967) (recognizing that tenants’
security of tenure was an important goal of federal housing legislation).
336. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 34, § 1.2.
337. Greene, 456 U.S. at 453, rejected hypothetical evaluation of defaulted parties’ cases as
an insufficient answer to those parties not fitting the stereotypes on which the evaluation—or
speculation—is based.
338. See Pernell, 416 U.S. at 384–85 (suggesting that a jury trial may be essential to
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governmental interests, the state shares the tenant’s interest in an accurate
adjudication.339 This is particularly true where those adjudications seek to serve
the broader social aims of the implied warranty of habitability. The state has
interests in the well-being of both its landlords and its tenants, but those
interests seem more apt to support substantive rules than procedures shifting
burdens among litigants.340 To be sure, eliminating LPOs would increase the
number of cases state courts would have to decide on the merits, increasing
costs. Still, the state legislatures and courts adopting the implied warranty
surely were aware that doing so would increase litigation costs and concluded
that bearing those costs was in the state’s interests.341 Overall, each of the
Mathews factors suggests that LPOs should be eliminated because they deprive
tenants of due process.
Tenants’ lawyers could have invoked each of these three doctrines to
invalidate LPOs. Even where lawyers did not raise these doctrines, however,
courts could and should have considered them in declining to announce LPO
requirements. This was particularly true in the many instances in which the
posture of the cases before them did not present LPOs for decision. Because
these courts were already reaching beyond questions presented to them, they
should have been careful to identify possible constitutional concerns.342
Although these and other theories343 would have been contested, they

obtaining justice for tenants). According to Rose & Scott, supra note 85, at 1003, tenants’ chances
of winning at least partial victories improved from one in seventeen to one in three when the
hearing was extended from less than five minutes to eleven minutes or more.
339. Cf. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981) (finding a similar state
interest in a case involving the termination of parental rights); Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 13–14
(1981) (finding a similar state interest in a case involving paternity).
340. The same sort of state interests in protecting classes of litigants received only the
scantiest discussion in Di-Chem, Fuentes, and Sniadach. Under Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436
U.S. 149, 158, 165 (1978), and Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 65, 71 (1972), the state could revert to
allowing landlords to repossess property through self-help. And Lindsey effectively allows it to
reduce the number and complexity of defenses available to tenants. 405 U.S. at 86 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting in part). But the state’s broad freedom to set substantive law does not imply authority to
achieve similar ends procedurally. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541
(1985).
341. In due process analysis, the state is generally not considered to have a legitimate
interest in avoiding decisions on the merits of claims it has chosen to authorize. Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
342. In other words, the courts were already disregarding prudential principles that counsel
against considering arguments not raised by the parties when they issued dicta about the
procedures in future eviction cases.
343. Separate majorities in Logan found due process and equal protection violations in a
state law that created rights but denied the opportunity to those whose complaints a state agency
did not process rapidly. The right to a trial could have served as the fundamental right to trigger
elevated scrutiny under the equal protection model announced in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35–36 (1973). The entrenchment of LPOs in the new regime of
landlord-tenant law also coincided with the growth of state constitutional law as an independent
source of civil liberties. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977).

Super.docx (Do Not Delete)

450

4/26/2011 10:58 PM

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99:389

nonetheless suggest that courts had ample means to question the legitimacy of
LPOs, had they been so inclined.
B. Procedural Failures: Lessons from the Welfare Rights Revolution
The procedural concerns central to the welfare rights revolution received
grossly insufficient attention in the tenants’ rights revolution. A few
jurisdictions recognized that procedural change was necessary to implement the
tenants’ rights revolution’s substantive changes.344 Unfortunately, these
jurisdictions relied on a self-transformation by the least-funded, lowest-status
courts in the judiciary, courts with well-developed sets of commitments largely
inconsistent with the new regime’s needs. This naïve reliance sprang from an
overestimation of the importance of the line between courts and administrative
agencies. Just as procedural due process and legitimacy concerns have
compelled administrative tribunals to take on many of the characteristics of
courts, managerial considerations have caused low-level courts to become more
like administrative agencies.
Although landlord-tenant courts emphatically adhere to a judicial form,
they have much in common with administrative tribunals. Like administrative
agencies, they must efficiently handle large numbers of cases with modest
resources. Also like administrative tribunals, they occupy an extremely low
place in the legal system’s social and structural hierarchy, and their decisions
often are subject to review by courts with little or no other appellate
jurisdiction.345 Thus, lessons from the welfare rights revolution’s administrative
tribunals may apply to the courts hearing landlord-tenant cases.
The adversarial system implicitly assumes that parties are rational actors
with lawyers and substantial, evenly matched resources to devote to
litigation.346 None of these assumptions are reliably met in eviction cases,
where tenants frequently lack representation and possess inferior resources.
Even as low-status courts were holding tenants rigidly to the adversarial
requirement that they develop the facts of repair problems, elite courts—whose
litigants were far better suited to the adversarial system—were increasingly
adopting continental ideas giving judges more responsibility for factual
development.347
344. See Eldergill, supra note 118, at 297–99.
345. Compare, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.605 (West 2008) (establishing circuit
courts as courts of general jurisdiction), and 42 PA. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 931 (West 2004) (same
for common pleas courts), with MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5753 (West. 2008) (allowing
appeals of evictions to circuit courts), and 68 PA. STAT. § 250.513 (2004) (same for common
pleas courts).
346. Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
494, 511–15 (1986).
347. Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, and
the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1247 (2005) (arguing
that this shift was not entirely new but was rather a revival of older traditions); John H. Langbein,
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Welfare recipients’ inability to initiate actions prevented Goldberg v.
Kelly’s administrative hearing system from transforming public welfare law,
but those hearing officers did far better at reaching individualized, merits-based
adjudications despite inferior resources and far more complex substantive
law.348 Whether by transferring eviction cases to actual administrative tribunals
or relying on magistrates, special masters, or other parajudicial officers whose
lower cost and specialization allow them to devote the time required to inquire
into the condition of the premises, easing the resource constraints and either
abandoning or destabilizing courthouse culture could have resulted in much
broader application of the implied warranty. This sort of transformation occurred a decade or so later in another area of law with a strong adversarial
history—child support. Some states maintain highly judicialized child support
systems, but many have responded to federal incentives to transfer most jurisdiction to administrative tribunals.349 Whether or not the cases stayed in court,
states adopted guidelines substantially narrowing adjudicatory discretion.350
C. The Dynamics of Housing Problems
The most fundamental challenge for the tenants’ rights movement, one
even harder to remedy than inconsistent substantive rules or unresponsive
courts, springs from its inability to adapt to social and economic change. In
particular, the movement was rooted in a conception of bad housing that
seemed to make sense in the peculiar conditions of the late 1960s and early
1970s but that has long since become obsolete. Just as the welfare rights
movement’s response to the problems of arbitrary eligibility workers and
malicious states proved wholly ineffectual when the national consensus in favor
of subsistence benefit programs collapsed, the tenants’ rights movement was
ill-equipped to respond to housing problems not involving vermin and falling
plaster. This Section shows how three other forms of bad housing became
increasingly important after the implied warranty of habitability arose. These
kinds of bad housing proved far less susceptible to a regulatory response. The
effects of tenants’ poverty are likely to be hydraulic: unless tenants’ incomes
improve, efforts to reduce the incidence of one kind of bad housing are likely to
increase the incidence of the others.
1. Types of Bad Housing
Housing is one of the most socially and economically complex
commodities individuals purchase. Housing arrangements can adversely affect
residents in at least four different ways. First, and most obviously, housing can

The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 825, 858–66 (1985).
348. Super, Efficient Rights, supra note 5, at 1086–89.
349. See 42 U.S.C. § 666(c) (2006).
350. See id. §§ 666(a)(10), 667(a).
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include unhealthy or unsafe conditions. Second, it can be remote from
important services its occupants need. Third, it can provide too little room for
the number of people occupying it. And fourth, it can consume so much of the
residents’ income that they face deprivation of other necessities. All four types
of housing problems often have severe deleterious consequences.
Unhealthy or unsafe conditions in decaying housing can cause profound
harm. Chipping and peeling paint at home is the dominant cause of childhood
lead poisoning, which can profoundly and permanently stunt children’s
intellectual and emotional development.351 Asthma is the leading cause of
urban school absences, and roach, rodent, and mold infestation are leading
causes of asthma.352
Another adverse effect of housing can be its relative isolation. Living in
inexpensive areas increases the difficulty and cost of obtaining employment
and child care. One study found that for every dollar low- and moderateincome working families save on housing they spend seventy-seven cents more
on transportation: those in relatively inexpensive housing had to pay more than
three times as much for transportation.353 Indeed, some 44 percent of moderateincome working families devote more than half of their incomes to shelter and
transportation.354 Inexpensive areas also often have bad schools,355 crime,
violence, and a dearth of opportunities356 that can have long-term impacts on
children’s lives. Access to jobs has become increasingly important as public
benefit programs have ceased to aid the long-term unemployed and increased
the administrative burdens of retaining assistance.357
Overcrowded housing also has a significant negative impact on children’s
educational attainment358 and health.359 Children in crowded housing are more
likely to suffer delayed cognitive development, to have trouble reading, and to
act out in school.360 Crowding into smaller spaces is only a partially successful
strategy: overcrowded families remain at higher risk for food shortages.361

351. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, THIRD NATIONAL REPORT ON HUMAN
EXPOSURE TO ENVIRONMENTAL CHEMICALS 38–42 (2005).
352. Patrick L. Kinney et al., On the Front Lines: An Environmental Asthma Intervention
in New York City, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 24, 24–25 (2002).
353. Id. at 16–18, 25.
354. Id. at 20.
355. Id. at 14.
356. See SHARON VANDIVERE ET AL., FUNDERS’ NETWORK FOR SMART GROWTH &
LIVABLE COMMUNITIES, HOW HOUSING AFFECTS CHILD WELL-BEING (2006).
357. See Super, Invisible Hand, supra note 55, at 832–36.
358. Dalton Conley, A Room with a View or a Room of One’s Own? Housing and Social
Stratification, 16 SOC. FORUM 263 (2001).
359. BARBARA J. LIPMAN, CTR. FOR HOUS. POL’Y, SOMETHING’S GOTTA GIVE: WORKING
FAMILIES AND THE COST OF HOUSING 35 (2005).
360. Gary W. Evans et al., Chronic Residential Crowding and Children’s Well-Being: An
Ecological Perspective, 69 CHILD DEV. 1514, 1514–15 (1998).
361. LIPMAN, supra note 359, at 35.
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Finally, high housing costs negatively impact residents’ ability to afford
other essentials. Moderate-income working tenants spending more than half
their incomes on housing spend significantly less on food and clothing, and
barely a quarter as much on health care, as those whose housing costs
consumed no more than 30 percent of their funds.362 As a result, they are
significantly more likely to run out of food before the end of the month and to
lack health insurance than similar families in more affordable housing.363
Children in food-insecure households such as these are 30 percent more likely
to be hospitalized and 90 percent more likely to be in fair or poor health
compared to their peers; they also are more likely to have mental illnesses and
problems in school.364 High housing costs are a significant cause of the high
rate of personal indebtedness among low- and moderate-income families.365
Stating which of these four defects is the most harmful is impossible a
priori. For example, although numerous physical defects may endanger
residents’ physical health, overcrowding can endanger their mental health,
isolation from healthcare facilities can cause treatable conditions to worsen,
and high rents can render tenants unable to afford medication. Thus lowincome tenants could quite reasonably choose badly maintained housing over a
better but more expensive dwelling. Despite conventional wisdom that public
housing is low quality, children in public housing projects are significantly
more likely to advance in school than other children in tenant households.366
Policy-makers should be loath to assume that their value judgments about the
best housing for a family are superior to the family’s own decisions.
2. The Changing Mix of Bad Housing
When courts and legislatures began to recognize the implied warranty of
habitability, housing codes routinely imposed maximum occupancy
requirements and the relationship between housing value and location was well
known.367 Indeed, overcrowding historically has been at least as prominent an
image of slum housing as physical defects.368 And many of the same studies
that mobilized concern about bad housing also detailed the broader effects of

362. Id. at 16.
363. Id. at 29.
364. CHILDREN’S SENTINEL NUTRITION ASSESSMENT PROGRAM (C-SNAP), THE SAFETY
NET IN ACTION 3 (2004).
365. LIPMAN, supra note 359, at 25.
366. Janet Currie & Aaron Yelowitz, Are Public Housing Projects Good for Kids?, 75 J.
PUB. ECON. 99, 101 (2000).
367. See, e.g., WILLIAM ALONSO, LOCATION AND LAND USE: TOWARD A GENERAL
THEORY OF LAND RENT 111–13 (1964) (describing housing values as complementary to
commuting costs).
368. JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 9, 205–07 (1961).
The two forms of bad housing often will be related: overcrowding results in more intensive wear
and more physical defects.
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poverty.369
Conditions at the time, however, distracted policymakers, activists, and
many scholars from forms of bad housing other than disrepair. A glut of
housing resulting from explosive suburban growth and white flight370 yielded
historically low rents.371 This, in turn, reduced the extent of overcrowding: a
low-income family might move into a cramped unit, but it was less likely to
have to double up with another low-income family.372 Optimism about the
simultaneous welfare rights revolution likely also produced complacency about
the availability of necessary funding.373 Finally, rapid suburbanization was
turning on its head the traditional means of valuing location, in which property
values declined the farther out from the center.374
As the unusual conditions of the 1960s and 1970s subsided, however, the
unsustainable housing glut disappeared and more typical housing market
conditions returned.375 Once again, new rental housing construction
disproportionately targets the top fifth of the rental market,376 doing little to
ease pressures in the lower end of the market. Housing costs are rising faster
than median incomes and much faster than incomes in the lower end of the
distribution.377 As a result, although a great many low-income renters still live
in decaying homes, other types of bad housing have come more to the fore. In
addition, this country’s industrial decline and the rise of a bicoastal economy
has led to much sharper regional differences in housing markets than were
369. KERNER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 69, at 258–59, 457–82. One of the most
influential antipoverty manifestos of the 1960s carefully addressed each of these forms of bad
housing. MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA 3–5, 147–49, 153–54, 164–65 (1962).
370. Deborah Kenn, Paradise Unfound: The American Dream of Housing Justice for All, 5
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 69, 70 (2005).
371. See George Sternlieb & James W. Hughes, Private Market Provision of Low-Income
Housing: Historical Perspective and Future Prospects, 2 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 123, 129–30
(1991) (describing a surplus of housing arising in the 1960s and increasing in the 1970s).
372. If proponents considered crowding at all, it was as a means by which tenants could
discipline landlords for raising rents. See Ackerman, supra note 86, at 1105.
373. Failure to come to grips with income issues also may reflect the lack of overlap
between people working on housing and income issues. The former were addressed in state courts
and state legislatures’ judiciary committees; the latter appeared in administrative agencies, federal
courts, Congress, and state legislatures’ appropriations processes. Influential legal services
lawyers typically specialized in housing or welfare, not both. Two welfare-oriented activists’
study of social movements in the 1960s and early 1970s has no chapter on tenants’ unions. PIVEN
& CLOWARD, supra note 70.
374. Proponents of the warranty saw the undesirable locations of low-income tenants’
housing as undermining landlords’ market power. Kennedy, supra note 145, at 487–92.
375. See Dowell Myers & John Pitkin, Demographic Forces and Turning Points in the
American City, 1950–2040, 626 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 91, 94 (2009) (describing
correction of low rents through large real increases from 1970 to 2000, outstripping income
growth).
376. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING: 2004, at 23
(2004). “Middle market” building nationally, however, has been proportionate to its share of the
rental market. Id.
377. Id. at 20.
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appreciated at the outset of the tenants’ rights revolution. It may have seemed
slightly odd a quarter-century ago for a high court in a rural state to invoke the
problems of urban slums to recognize the implied warranty of habitability.378
That incongruity pales next to that seen today between housing market
dynamics in coastal boomtowns such as Seattle and Boston, on the one hand,
and those in collapsing industrial cities in the nation’s interior, such as St.
Louis and Detroit, on the other.
Data from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s
(HUD) American Housing Survey over the past three decades show a huge
decline in the availability of unsubsidized low-rent housing.379 These same data
show a significant increase in overcrowding among low-income people,
particularly in the prosperous metropolitan areas on the East and West Coasts
where redevelopment has reestablished the desirability of central locations.380
As a result, HUD has reported that about half of very-low-income renters
not receiving public subsidies have “worst-case” housing problems.381 Almost
60 percent of tenants with worst-case housing needs are children, elderly, or
people with disabilities.382 Almost four in five very-low-income renters have
moderate to severe housing problems—bad conditions, crowding, or housing
consuming so much of the family’s budget that it tends to crowd out other
necessities383—with most of the rest apparently receiving government
subsidies.384
Yet over the decades since the implied warranty became widely
recognized, the nature of these worst-case problems has changed. The number
of very-low-income tenants reported in severely inadequate conditions has
dropped by about two-thirds, but the number with crushing rent burdens
skyrocketed.385 Despite a broad consensus that housing should not consume
more than one-third of a family’s budget, some 60 percent of households with
incomes below 30 percent of their area’s median—households HUD classifies
378. See, e.g., Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202 (Vt. 1984).
379. See, e.g., EDWARD B. LAZERE, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, IN SHORT
SUPPLY: THE GROWING AFFORDABLE HOUSING GAP (1995); PAUL A. LEONARD & EDWARD B.
LAZERE, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, A PLACE TO CALL HOME: THE LOW INCOME
HOUSING CRISIS IN 44 MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREAS (1992).
380. See MILLS, supra note 81, at 64 (expounding an economic model in which the cost of
housing is inversely related to its distance from the center); Doug Timmer, Urban Revitalization?
Bah, Humbug, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 14, 1998, at 18 (discussing the varying recent development
patterns of coastal and interior cities).
381. OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., TRENDS
IN WORST CASE NEEDS FOR HOUSING, 1978–1999, at 7 (2003) [hereinafter HUD TRENDS]. The
U.S. Housing Act defines “very-low-income” as less than half of median income in the area,
which includes the overwhelming majority of people below the poverty line and many of the nearpoor. Id. at 10.
382. Id. at 3.
383. Id. at 13.
384. See id. at 27.
385. Id. at 8.
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as extremely low-income—pay over half of their incomes for rent.386 Thirteen
million working families, including four million supported by a full-time
worker, pay over half of their incomes for shelter.387
The tenants’ rights movement did not successfully adapt to these changes
in housing needs. The implied warranty is not a tool for preventing high rent
burdens or overcrowding. Moreover, the substantive and procedural obstacles
discussed above suggest that the warranty of habitability is unlikely to have
played any significant role in reducing the incidence of housing defects. That
reduction probably is the result of the lack of long-term economic viability of
much of the low-cost housing market except in areas with extremely low land
values. The current glut resulting from the burst housing bubble is depressing
housing values in the short term, although likely not to the degree that white
flight did in the post–World War II decades. The lesson of the past thirty years,
however, is that this momentarily inexpensive housing will not last: some will
be rehabilitated and reabsorbed into the middle-income market, and much of
the rest will be abandoned and destroyed. Because much of the newly vacant
housing is of less substantial construction than what the new suburbanites left
behind in the central cities previously, the process of decay and abandonment
may proceed more rapidly.
Policies prioritizing elimination of physically defective housing over other
kinds of housing problems have wide-ranging consequences for antipoverty
policy. Eliminating physically defective housing may increase rents, thereby
pushing more low-income households to live in remote areas, which in turn is
likely to aggravate problems connecting them with employment and
transportation. Transportation is one of the least subsidized major expenses for
low-income families, and even public transportation policy commonly favors
affluent suburbanites who must be lured out of their cars.388 Concentration of
low-income people in undesirable urban locations also is likely to reduce
employment opportunities,389 as well as the education available to low-income
children and the fiscal stability of the municipalities with concentrated
poverty.390
386. DANILO PELLETIERE ET AL., NAT’L LOW-INCOME HOUS.
THE BURDEN? SEVERELY UNAFFORDABLE HOUSING 1 (2005).
387. LIPMAN, supra note 359, at 10. This study defined a family

COAL., WHO’S BEARING

as working if at least half
of its income was earned and its annual income was less than 120 percent of the local area median
income. Id. at 15.
388. N.Y. Urban League, Inc. v. New York, 71 F.3d 1031 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding such
favoritism a rational exercise of transit system managers’ business judgment); Comm. for a Better
N. Phila. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., Civ. A. No. 88-1275, 1990 WL 121177 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14,
1990) (recognizing such disparities but not finding them actionable); Sean B. Seymore, Comment,
Set the Captives Free!: Transit Inequity in Urban Centers, and the Laws and Policies Which
Aggravate the Disparity, 16 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 57 (2005).
389. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW
URBAN POOR 149–82 (1996).
390. James M. Buchanan, Principles of Urban Fiscal Strategy, 11 PUBLIC CHOICE 1, 13–
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In addition, the tenants’ rights movement has neglected the issue of
overcrowding. Increasing the numbers of low-income families doubling up in
housing can prevent public benefit programs’ eligibility tests from measuring
need properly.391 Involuntary overcrowding also can twist power relationships
within families, increasing the risk of abuse; such intra-familial abuse is a
problem that antipoverty law finds particularly difficult to address.392
Finally, the tenants’ rights movement has not adapted to what appears to
be the current major housing problem: high rent burdens. Allowing housing
costs to crowd out other necessities exacerbates the inequities between the large
majority of low-income people receiving no major housing subsidies and the
minority that do.393 It also increases the chances that families will feel
compelled to trade some of the public benefits they receive to meet other needs
for housing, thus undermining those programs’ integrity and support.
Even if the implied warranty of habitability and housing code enforcement
were effective against defective housing, the effects of low-income tenants’
poverty likely would have proven hydraulic, producing a different kind of bad
housing. Indeed, this is true even if one posits that rent control prevented sharp
cost increases as landlords were compelled to make repairs—a highly debatable
assumption—and that housing code enforcement further prevented overcrowding. Nevertheless, in economically healthy metropolitan areas this
hydraulic effect might well have shrunken the supply of low-cost housing units
to the point that low-income renters faced stiff competition even for units
isolated from jobs and transit lines, with many at risk for homelessness.
3. Consequences of Selective Enforcement of the Warranty
As shown above, substantive and procedural limitations on the new
landlord-tenant regime tend to limit the warranty of habitability’s applicability
to more affluent tenants that deliberately initiate disputes with their landlords
rather than poorer ones who might raise the warranty defensively. This has
several perverse impacts, some apparent and others hidden. Most obviously,
this frustrates the redistributive and humanitarian purposes of the reforms and
leaves most serious housing problems unaddressed. Thus, the net effect of the
new regime, if selectively enforced in this manner, may be negative rather than
neutral. A major source of new, low-cost, unsubsidized housing has long been
units that “filter-down” from higher-cost housing markets after years of
16 (1971).
391. See Robinson v. Block, 869 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding that two siblings residing
in the same house may not “live together” for purposes of rules requiring co-resident adult siblings
to apply for food stamps together).
392. ROB GEEN ET AL., URBAN INST., WELFARE REFORM’S EFFECT ON CHILD WELFARE
CASELOADS 9–10, 34–37 (2001); ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY’S CHILDREN 118–21 (1999).
393. See David A. Super, From the Greenhouse to the Poorhouse: Carbon-Emissions
Control and the Rules of Legislative Joinder, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1170–71 (2010)
(quantifying these inequities) [hereinafter Super, Greenhouse].
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disrepair.394 If middle-income tenants compel their landlords to keep their
dwellings in good repair, the warranty may stymie the slow decay that allows
units to migrate to the low-cost market.395
This suggests that, at least in healthy cities, low-income tenants’ quality of
life may not be improving even if the incidence of housing code violations has
declined. Some continue to under-consume housing, but in different ways:
renting units that are too small or in isolated or dangerous areas rather than
ones that are decrepit. Others may be consuming more housing but paying for it
with painful sacrifices in other areas of consumption, such as food, clothing,
and utility service. The lack of “filter-down” housing is certainly not the only
factor shrinking the supply of low-cost housing. Gentrification, continued
lower-profile efforts at urban renewal, and recent reductions in federal housing
subsidies396 all have reduced supply. At the same time, the stagnation of the
minimum wage, cuts in income support programs, and other factors have
increased poverty and hence demand. This suggests that the low-cost housing
market in many areas is precarious enough to raise fears that seeking to force
improvements in housing quality or tenants’ well-being could risk potentially
serious unintended consequences.
The story likely is somewhat different in the ailing cities in the nation’s
heartland. There, declining populations have placed less pressure on housing
demand. Abandonment, however, has caused a continuing exodus of units from
the low-cost housing market. Enforcing the warranty of habitability on behalf
of middle-income tenants deliberately raising repair claims cannot halt the
deterioration of low-cost housing to the point that abandonment becomes
economically desirable. Here, stronger enforcement of the warranty of
habitability on behalf of those in the worst housing may still have significant
promise. But, as shown above, that remains an elusive goal.
D. The Failure of the Implied Warranty of Habitability
Although appealing in the abstract, the new regime of landlord-tenant law
inaugurated four decades ago has failed at achieving any of its major goals.
Some individual tenants no doubt have benefited. Some conscientious landlords
may have yielded to the moral suasion of the implied warranty. Some
inefficient landlords may have been induced to sell to companies better capable
of performing repairs. Some community organizing efforts built around the

394. Ackerman, supra note 86, at 1113–17.
395. On the other hand, preventing housing decay in transitional communities may have
large positive externalities for neighbors, see Wilson & Kelling, supra note 81 (finding that even
small defects in buildings can have a crucial negative signaling effect), and can help stabilize
those communities by increasing social and economic diversity.
396. See, e.g., DOUGLAS RICE & BARBARA SARD, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES,
DECADE OF NEGLECT HAS WEAKENED FEDERAL LOW-INCOME HOUSING PROGRAMS (2009),
available at http://www.cbpp.org/2-24-09hous.pdf.
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implied warranty may have produced positive results. And in some segments of
the middle-income housing market, these reforms may have achieved positive
results. For the most part, however, the supposed tenants’ rights revolution is
the legal system’s exercise in self-delusion. The mistaken belief that the
implied warranty of habitability somehow “solved” low-income people’s
housing problems may have induced an unfortunate sense of complacency.
As different as its doctrinal and institutional setting, the tenants’ rights
revolution in the end succumbed to the same six defects that doomed the
contemporaneous welfare rights revolution. First, its multiplicity of goals—
modernization, housing restoration, redistribution, and humanitarianism—
prevented a definitive assessment. It did introduce more contract principles into
landlord-tenant law, although the result is still very much a hybrid without
particularly compelling reasons for its idiosyncrasies. Without a better-defined
goal than “modernization,” this seems a rather modest achievement. Its
substantive and procedural limitations appear to have confined its direct effects
to a tiny handful of cases. These likely were too few to have much impact on
the overall urban environment or the broader distribution of wealth. The
extreme infrequency of the implied warranty’s application has prevented an
empirical resolution to the debate about whether it would improve the lot of
low-income tenants or burden them with an inefficient housing market. It did
allow some sophisticated, or represented, tenants the choice of whether to
demand repairs: instead of an absolute right for all tenants, the implied
warranty should be analyzed as an option available to the small minority of
tenants winning the legal services “lottery.”397 These individual tenants may be
best equipped to assess whether their particular landlords will respond and
whether the value to them of repairs exceeds not only the risks of litigating but
also any increase in rent as their dwelling becomes more desirable. The
warranty may therefore have accomplished some redistribution on a micro
scale. Still, those tenants most in need of redistribution—or simply humanitarian aid—typically have been among the least able to assert the warranty.
Second, many of these shortcomings result from policy-makers’ inability
to resist moralizing at low-income people. Those most likely to find the new
defenses worth raising, and who typically live in the worst housing, are verylow-income tenants falling behind on their rent involuntarily. Yet the new
regime could not bring itself to enlist these willing soldiers because it deemed
them unworthy of the warranty’s assistance. The presence of a few
redistributionalists in their midst also may have alarmed the new regime’s other
supporters and caused them to bend over backwards to demonstrate that they
were not seeking to give poor tenants something for nothing. The stakes for

397. Whether legal services contribute to social welfare by representing these few tenants
has spawned vigorous debate. E.g., Steven Gunn, Eviction Defense for Poor Tenants: Costly
Compassion or Justice Served?, 13 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 385 (1995).
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landlords—and their superior wealth, connections with social elites, and ability
to organize collective action—made a backlash inevitable. History suggests
attacks on low-income people often take the form of moralizing.398
Nonetheless, the regime’s champions were unprepared for that backlash and
failed to equip judges and legislators to resist it.
Third, because the new regime never developed any coherent theory of
why many tenants had low incomes, it was unprepared for the procedural
challenges it was creating. The same lack of basic skills that prevents many
low-income people from obtaining better jobs that would allow them to afford
better housing also tends to make them ineffective advocates in court.399
Represented tenants did far better in court, but with no one prepared to fund
free representation for more than a token number of low-income tenants, or to
wholeheartedly embrace an active role for the judge that would mitigate
tenants’ disadvantages from being unrepresented, the few tenants winning the
legal aid lottery have had little impact on the overall picture. More broadly, the
new regime replaced a system in which landlords dominate by a preponderance
of financial capital alone with one in which they dominate by a combination of
preponderances in financial and human capital.
Fourth, the tenants’ rights revolution’s crude vision of economics required
it to assume the conditions required for its success. Some of these—
particularly a glut of rental housing—may fortuitously have existed at the
revolution’s inception. Others were lacking, including market conditions that
prevented landlords from exiting the low-rent housing market and sufficient
incentives for tenants to deliberately withhold rent.
Fifth, the tenants’ rights revolution relied on a simplistic understanding of
the lower courts that hear eviction cases. Hard-pressed courts can and do ration
adjudicatory resources and otherwise behave in many of the same ways as
administrative agencies. Judges and clerks have well-established views of their
mission. Many have longstanding relationships with repeat-player landlords
and landlords’ lawyers. Policy-makers underestimated how difficult it would be
to implement the warranty under these conditions.
Finally, and most importantly, the revolution’s multiplicity of goals
prevented any creative adaptation to the dramatic changes in both housing
markets and antipoverty policy since the revolution’s onset. Resurrecting the
new regime of landlord-tenant law will require a willingness to confront these
and other entrenched problems and the devotion of political capital to surmount
them. Based on the record to date, we have little grounds for optimism.
398. Super, New Moralizers, supra note 50, at 2053–55, 2073–74.
399. See Martha R. Burt, The “Hard-to-Serve”: Definitions and Implications, in WELFARE
REFORM: THE NEXT ACT 163–70 (Alan Weil & Kenneth Finegold eds., 2002) (finding that many
of the conditions preventing low-income people from finding and holding jobs, such as illiteracy
and psychological ailments, also prevent them from interacting effectively with the welfare
system).
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CONCLUSION
The breadth and severity of legal, economic, and practical problems surely
doomed the implied warranty of habitability. Some of its goals may have been
unrealistic from the start: the economics of the housing market may well have
prevented significant redistribution of wealth from landlords to tenants and
made efforts to stamp out one kind of housing problem likely to yield more
housing problems of another type. A more thoughtful approach, however,
might have allowed more effective humanitarian interventions and might have
produced a more coherent modernization of landlord-tenant law.
The narrow lesson of the failure of the implied warranty of habitability is
that direct subsidies have far more potential than regulatory action to improve
low-income tenants’ housing conditions. Researchers have come to see
improving incomes, rather than housing-specific strategies, as pivotal to
preventing homelessness.400 HUD reports the number of tenants with worstcase housing needs moderates only when incomes rise.401 In a sense, the
implied warranty was a forerunner of the movement to shift responsibility for
aiding low-income people to elements of the private sector, albeit here
unwilling ones.
Housing assistance programs increasingly attempt to address all four
kinds of detrimental housing conditions.402 Units long have needed to pass
inspections to receive subsidies under federal voucher programs. Since the late
1960s, federal subsidy programs have sought to limit tenants’ shelter costs to
30 percent of their incomes.403 A family’s size determines the size of the unit
for which it is eligible. And Congress and HUD have steadily made housing
vouchers more portable, allowing low-income recipients to move from areas of
concentrated poverty.404 Unfortunately, the supply of vouchers has never
approached the number of low-income renters in need.405 Indeed, Congress
consistently has failed to increase the supply of housing vouchers sufficiently
to offset the shrinkage in unsubsidized low-cost housing. As a result, only one
in five eligible families receives a subsidy.406
400. Martha R. Burt, Causes of the Growth of Homelessness During the 1980s, 2 HOUS.
POL’Y DEBATE 903, 904 (1991).
401. HUD TRENDS, supra note 381, at 1.
402. Although welfare economics might suggest that cash transfers would be more
beneficial than in-kind assistance, Komesar, supra note 150, at 1175–76, the U.S. electorate has
developed a strong antipathy for cash aid programs. Super, Quiet Revolution, supra note 128, at
1291–92.
403. U.S. Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(2)(A)(i) (2006).
404. ABT ASSOCS. INC., EFFECTS OF HOUSING VOUCHERS ON WELFARE FAMILIES vi
(2006).
405. See Super, Political Economy, supra note 133, at 695–701 (explaining the difficulty
the electorate has comprehending programs that do not serve all eligible people making
application).
406. See Super, Greenhouse, supra note 393, at 1190–96 (proposing consolidation of
existing housing assistance efforts into a single program available to all low-income people).
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The broader lesson is that a far more sophisticated approach is required to
regulate effectively on behalf of low-income people. Even Milton Friedman
recognized that a necessary quid pro quo for avoiding the inefficiency of
regulatory redistributions was an adequate system of direct supports for lowincome people.407 With contemporary conservatives increasingly unwilling to
support tax-and-transfer policies, low-income people’s advocates cannot afford
to abandon regulatory responses to humanitarian problems altogether.
Regulatory interventions, however, must be much more carefully designed
than they have been in the past. First, they should either seek to correct some
demonstrable market failure or should serve an important humanitarian
purpose. Vague concepts like modernization are unlikely to mobilize much
support but can sow confusion. Instrumental arguments also muddy the waters
and make the enterprise vulnerable to counter-proposals to accomplish the
same ends in another way. Above all, even a hint of broad redistributive goals
will taint the effort and cause its champions to make disastrous concessions to
distance themselves from that taint.
Second, humanitarian regulation should not be attempted unless its
advocates are prepared to respond to efforts to stigmatize beneficiaries. Thus,
for example, prohibiting utility terminations during winter months will benefit
spendthrifts as well as infirm seniors; if the plan’s proponents are unwilling to
make the case that cutting off anyone’s heat in the dead of winter is inhumane,
debates over what are and are not worthy causes for arrears will quickly
consume the plan.
Third, the system’s operation should be as automatic as possible. Relying
on low-income people to negotiate even fairly simple procedures, or on
bureaucracies to empathize with them and adjudicate in their favor, all but
guarantees a high failure rate. Moral tests are among the most problematic to
adjudicate; avoiding them is likely to improve the regulatory regime’s
operation considerably.
Fourth, burdens should be spread broadly through society to avoid
creating an obvious core of opponents. Barring winter shut-offs, for example,
increases utility companies’ costs, which they presumably pass on to
consumers. The impact on each individual consumer, however, is too small to
spur political mobilization.408
Fifth, where possible, regulatory interventions should seek to motivate
actions with benefits that clearly exceed their costs. Thus, for example, the cost
for a landlord to cover exposed wiring is a pittance, yet the potential harm to
the tenant’s children is extreme. Imposing severe penalties for exposed wiring
is unlikely to drive landlords from the market. Such a regulatory regime would

407. FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 177–82.
408. The vehemence of utility companies’ opposition to moratoria on terminations is likely
to depend on what other issues are pending on the state’s energy regulatory agenda.
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merely reproduce the result the parties likely would have negotiated themselves
with full information and bargaining capacity.
Finally, where regulation demands costly changes, advocates should
carefully explore possible collateral consequences. They then should monitor
implementation and be prepared to adapt if new or unnoticed conditions
undermine their regulatory scheme similar to the way housing market changes
undermined the tenants’ rights revolution. For example, the cost of abating lead
paint is daunting, but the lifelong harm to children exposed to lead makes it
necessary. The cost is great enough to affect the supply of rental housing.
Advocates therefore should consider whether subsidizing those costs or taking
other actions to preserve housing supply are cost-effective, and they should
monitor changes in that supply.
Even following all of these principles will provide no guarantees of
success and will not supplant fiscal policy as the primary means of protecting
low-income people from humanitarian crises. It will, however, mean that all of
the hope and effort invested in the tenants’ rights revolution will not have been
in vain.
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